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Given  the  worldwide  necessity  to  reduce  anthropogenic  contributions  to  global  
climate  change,  an  increased  focus  on  nuclear  energy  over  traditional  fossil  fuel  based  
sources  is  arguably  justified.  This  paper  attempts  to  analyze  whether  it  is  possible  for  
small  modular  nuclear  reactors  in  particular  to  contribute  to  that  transition,  specifically  
through  their  utilization  in  an  urban  environment.  For  this  analysis,  an  urban  setting  is  
defined  as  a  large  American  university  that  currently  produces  a  portion  of  its  
electricity  demand  at  an  onsite  cogeneration  facility.  The  University  of  North  Carolina  
at  Chapel  Hill  is  used  as  a  basic  model  for  this  university  setting  in  this  analysis.  All  
relevant  considerations  were  evaluated  to  determine  overall  feasibility  of  potential  SMR  
implementation  in  this  setting,  as  well  as  the  requirements  for  specific  design  selection.  
Based  on  these  requirements,  three  models  were  selected  for  further  analysis:  SVBR-­‐‑100,  
TWR-­‐‑P,  and  EM2.  All  three  were  found  to  be  suitable  for  university  implementation,  
thus  confirming  the  overall  feasibility  of  SMR  implementation  in  the  described  urban  
setting.  While  the  most  appropriate  model  depends  on  the  specific  inputs  to  the  
developed  ranking  system  (which  can  be  adjusted  for  various  potential  universities),  
overall  EM2  and  TWR-­‐‑P  can  be  considered  the  more  suitable  of  the  three.    
1.  Introduction  
   As  the  effects  of  increased  greenhouse  gas  concentrations  in  the  atmosphere  
intensify  and  the  negative  environmental  and  health-­‐‑related  consequences  of  continued  
fossil  fuel  use  escalate,  the  necessity  to  transition  to  more  sustainable  and  cost  effective  
energy  sources  becomes  more  pronounced.  While  arguments  can  certainly  be  made  for  
increased  reliance  on  solar,  wind,  and  other  renewable  energy  sources,  these  
technologies  are  still  fairly  new  and  under  engaged  in  America’s  energy  landscape.  Full  
reliance  on  these  sources  cannot  yet  be  achieved  without  first  obtaining  significant  
improvements  in  the  nation’s  grid  system  -­‐‑  the  ability  to  transport  electricity  -­‐‑  and  in  
energy  storage  technologies,  as  solar  and  wind  cannot  be  reliably  utilized  without  
backup  energy  production  systems.  Thus,  while  a  future  in  renewable  technologies  will  
develop  over  time,  the  fact  remains  that  immediate  action  must  be  taken  to  reduce  the  
nation’s  greenhouse  gas  output,  its  dependence  on  foreign  fuels,  and  the  environmental  
degradation  associated  with  domestic  coal  mining.  Nuclear  energy,  despite  long  
existing  (and  arguably  somewhat  misguided)  reservations  concerning  safety  and  
security,  can  be  viewed  as  an  alternative  energy  approach  with  the  ability  to  provide  
enough  safe  and  reliable  power  to  meet  current  and  future  demands.  Small  modular  
nuclear  reactors  (SMRs)  in  particular,  offer  substantial  benefits  in  safety,  security,  
operational  flexibilities,  and  economics,  and  may  play  a  key  role  in  the  nation’s  
transition  from  fossil  fuel  use  to  more  environmentally  friendly  sources  of  energy  [14].    
SMRs,  while  still  a  fairly  new  concept  for  the  commercial  market,  are  based  heavily  on  
they  can  be  implemented  either  above  or  underground  and  as  single  units  or  as  
modules  in  a  larger  complex.  While  initially  conceived  for  specialized  applications  or  
for  use  in  remote  locations,  SMRs  are,  in  fact,  applicable  to  a  broader  commercial  
market  and  will  likely  play  a  key  role  in  the  transition  away  from  traditional  fossil  fuel  
use  toward  nuclear  power  [23].    
The  current  use  of  SMRs  is  limited  to  specialized  applications,  e.g.,  providing  
power  for  submarines  and  other  naval  vessels  as  well  as  for  use  in  remote  locations  
where  the  existing  electrical  grid  cannot  handle  the  output  of  larger  reactors.  However,  
no  SMRs  currently  operate  in  the  U.S.  for  commercial  electricity  production.  The  goal  of  
this  conceptual  design  is  thus  to  evaluate  the  possibility  of  implementing  an  
underground  small  modular  nuclear  reactor  in  an  urban  environment  as  a  key  source  of  
baseload  electricity  and  steam  heat  generation  and  to  determine  the  ideal  setup  for  this  
scenario.  As  the  use  of  such  a  reactor  in  an  urban  setting  has  not  yet  been  carried  out,  all  
considerations  involved  in  the  construction,  implementation,  and  use  of  an  SMR  in  this  
type  of  environment  are  evaluated  to  determine  the  overall  feasibility  of  such  
implementation  as  well  as  the  appropriate  design  and  siting.  
In  general,  the  model  for  the  “urban  setting”  used  in  this  evaluation  is  a  typical  
American  college  town  with  a  large  university  that  includes  a  hospital  and  produces  a  
portion  of  its  electricity  demand  at  an  on-­‐‑campus,  coal-­‐‑fired  plant.  Specifically,  the  
model  siting  chosen  for  this  conceptual  design  is  the  University  of  North  Carolina  and  
its  Cogeneration  Power  Plant.  Implementation  of  a  properly  sized  SMR  would  eliminate  
the  university’s  need  to  purchase  the  remaining  required  electricity  from  a  local  utility,  
which  in  the  University  of  North  Carolina’s  case,  is  Duke  Energy.  Additionally,  as  37%  
of  the  electricity  generated  in  the  US  is  produced  by  coal-­‐‑fired  power  plants,  the  
reduction  of  electricity  purchased  and  used  from  such  utilities  in  favor  of  electricity  
produced  by  an  onsite  nuclear  reactor  results  in  a  contribution  to  reduced  greenhouse  
gas  emissions  [36].  A  model  site  that  currently  produces  a  portion  of  its  electricity  
demand  on  site  is  chosen  since  the  presence  of  an  existing  plant  decreases  construction  
requirements  given  that  a  distribution  system  is  already  in  place.  While  the  
implementation  of  an  SMR  at  a  site  that  does  not  possess  such  infrastructure  is  certainly  
conceivable,  it  is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  study.          
This  feasibility  analysis  begins  with  an  evaluation  of  the  required  considerations  
associated  with  the  implementation  of  a  small  modular  reactor  in  this  specific  type  of  
urban  setting,  which  will  determine  the  most  applicable  and  feasible  design  for  the  
setting  in  question.  These  considerations  include  (1)  required  power  output,  (2)  costs,  
(3)  safety  requirements,  (4)  security  requirements,  (5)  waste  disposal,  (6)  integration  of  
the  SMR  into  the  current  facility  setup,  (7)  total  emission  considerations,  and  (8)  public  
reception.  Given  a  few  baseline  requirements  determined  in  this  section,  including  
required  electrical  output,  a  few  potential  models  will  be  chosen  for  consideration.  
Then,  each  model  will  be  further  evaluated  for  its  potential  to  meet  the  considerations  
mentioned  above  and  the  plausibility  of  the  implementation  of  each  model  will  be  
discussed.  Finally,  the  ideal  conceptual  design(s)  and  setup,  if  one  exists,  will  be  
presented.    
Should  it  be  possible  to  determine  a  particular  model  that  can  feasibly  be  
implemented  in  this  type  of  urban  setting,  the  findings  of  this  analysis  would  present  an  
exciting  opportunity  for  large  universities,  similar  to  the  University  of  North  Carolina,  
that  currently  produce  a  portion  of  their  own  electrical  demand.  Given  the  proposed  set  
up,  these  universities  would  be  able  to  implement  an  SMR  that  would  produce  all  
electricity  demand  on  site,  reducing  costs  associated  with  the  continued  purchase  of  
power  from  a  utility  and  emissions  associated  with  electricity  production  from  a  fossil  
fuel.  Such  a  set  up  would  also  equip  the  university  to  be  prepared  for  any  growth  in  
electrical  demand  that  is  likely  to  take  place,  as  the  power  output  of  most  SMR  models  
currently  being  developed  exceeds  the  current  demand  expected  by  a  university  in  this  
type  of  scenario.  Thus,  interested  universities  would  have  the  opportunity  to  make  a  
significant  statement  concerning  their  commitment  to  energy  independence  and  
reducing  greenhouse  gas  emissions,  while  providing  safe  and  reliable  power  to  their  
community.  Before  such  implementation  can  take  place,  an  in  depth  analysis  of  all  
contributing  factors  associated  with  the  construction  and  use  of  a  small  nuclear  plant  in  
an  urban  setting  must  take  place.          
2.  Brief  Overview  of  SMRs  
The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  defines  a  “small”  reactor  as  one  
with  an  electrical  output  of  less  than  300  MW(e)  [14].  These  reactors  stand  in  stark  
contrast  to  the  large  units  that  have  come  to  dominate  the  current  nuclear  energy  
landscape.  Since  the  establishment  of  nuclear  power  generation  in  the  1950s,  the  
electrical  potential  of  reactor  units  has  increased  dramatically  from  about  60  MW(e)  to  
more  than  1600  MW(e).  The  economies  of  scale  associated  with  such  large  reactors  
represent  the  key  driving  force  of  the  growth  in  size  and  electrical  output  observed  
since  the  1950s.  Despite  this  transition,  there  has  also  been  a  consistent  historical  
presence  of  smaller  power  reactors  built  for  naval  use  and  as  neutron  sources  in  
research  reactors,  resulting  in  a  great  deal  of  expertise  concerning  the  engineering  of  
smaller  nuclear  units  as  well  [29].  Due  to  the  perceived  benefits  associated  with  lower  
initial  capital  investment,  scalability,  siting  flexibility,  factory  construction,  and  design  
simplicity  as  well  as  the  knowledge  and  experience  gained  through  the  previous  use  of  
small  reactors,  SMRs  are  seen  as  a  promising  development  within  the  nuclear  energy  
industry.  The  Department  of  Energy  (DOE)  believes  that  SMRs  may  play  an  important  
role  in  addressing  the  energy,  economic  and  climate  goals  of  the  U.S.  if  they  can  be  
commercially  deployed  within  the  next  decade  [27].  
Most  modern  SMRs  are  designed  for  a  high  level  of  passive  or  inherent  safety  in  
the  event  of  malfunction.  Additionally,  most  are  intended  for  below  grade  
implementation,  resulting  in  a  high  resistance  to  proliferation  and  terrorist  threats.  In  
addition,  SMRs  are  expected  to  be  much  safer  than  conventional  large-­‐‑scale  reactors,  
with  a  greater  simplicity  of  design.  A  2010  report  conducted  by  the  American  Nuclear  
Society  concluded  that  many  of  the  safety  provisions  necessary  in  large  reactors  are  not  
necessary  in  the  small  designs  currently  being  developed  [29].  These  smaller,  compact  
designs  are  factory-­‐‑fabricated  and  can  be  transported  by  truck  or  rail  to  the  intended  
site,  providing  enhanced  flexibility  in  site  selection  for  SMR  implementation  [27].  
Finally,  small  units  are  seen  as  a  much  more  manageable  investment  than  large-­‐‑scale  
conventional  reactors,  as  they  offer  economies  of  mass  production,  and  reduced  
construction  costs  and  duration  [29],  [27].    
The  benefits  of  this  technology  are  evident  in  recent  nuclear  agency  decision-­‐‑
making  concerning  SMR  development.  A  2009  assessment  by  the  International  Atomic  
Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  under  its  Innovative  Nuclear  Power  Reactors  &  Fuel  Cycle  
(INPRO)  program  concluded  that  there  could  be  96  small  modular  reactors  (SMRs)  in  
operation  around  the  world  by  2030  in  its  'ʹhigh'ʹ  case,  and  43  units  in  the  'ʹlow'ʹ  case  [29].  
While  deployments  in  the  US  are  yet  to  be  formally  scheduled,  numerous  US-­‐‑based  
companies  are  in  the  process  of  finalizing  SMR  designs  for  potential  future  deployment.  
Likewise,  a  2011  report  for  the  US  DOE  by  the  University  of  Chicago  Energy  Policy  
Institute  stated  that  the  development  of  small  reactors  can  create  an  opportunity  for  the  
US  to  recapture  a  slice  of  the  nuclear  technology  market  that  has  eroded  over  the  last  
several  decades  as  companies  in  other  countries  have  expanded  into  full-­‐‑scale  reactors  
for  domestic  and  export  purposes.  Additionally,  the  report  explains  that  small  reactors  
could  significantly  mitigate  the  financial  risk  associated  with  full-­‐‑scale  plants,  
potentially  allowing  small  reactors  to  compete  effectively  with  other  energy  sources  
[29].  Finally,  begun  in  fiscal  year  2012,  the  DOE  Office  of  Nuclear  Energy’s  Small  
Modular  Reactor  Licensing  Technical  Support  program  advanced  the  certification  and  
licensing  of  domestic  SMR  designs  that  are  relatively  mature  and  can  be  deployed  in  the  
next  decade.  The  DOE  announced  its  decision  in  November  2012  to  support  the  
Babcock  &Wilcox  180  MW(e)  mPower  design,  and  in  December  2013  it  announced  that  
a  grant  would  be  made  to  NuScale  on  a  50-­‐‑50  cost-­‐‑share  basis,  to  support  design  
development  and  NRC  certification  and  licensing  of  its  45  MW(e)  SMR  design  [29],  [16].  
These  designs,  as  well  as  many  others,  will  be  discussed  in  later  sections  to  determine  
their  potential  for  implementation.    
3.  Considerations  Specific  to  Urban  Environment    
3.1  Required  Power  Output    
One  of  the  first  factors  that  must  be  considered  when  attempting  to  implement  a  
small  modular  nuclear  reactor  in  conjunction  with  an  existing  electrical  generation  
facility  in  a  university  environment  is  how  much  electricity  should  be  produced  by  the  
SMR.  The  fact  that  so  much  variety  exists  among  universities  that  produce  and  
purchase  different  sized  portions  of  their  electrical  demand  makes  it  impractical  to  
pinpoint  a  specific  required  output  for  the  site.  However,  it  is  desirable  to  distinguish  a  
range  broad  enough  to  cover  the  model  site’s  current  demand  while  allowing  room  for  
future  increases,  but  narrow  enough  to  serve  as  means  of  eliminating  various  models  
from  consideration.  In  the  first  full  year  of  operation  of  the  cogeneration  facility  the  
University’s  peak  electrical  demand  was  about  55  MW(e).  Since  then,  the  peak  has  been  
over  75  MW(e)  and  is  anticipated  to  reach  100  MW(e)  in  the  near  future.    
SMRs  currently  under  development  range  in  output  from  less  than  2.5  MW(e)  to  
300  MW(e).  Based  on  this  particular  university’s  peak  demand,  a  suitable  minimum  
required  electrical  capacity  that  allows  ample  room  for  future  growth  in  demand  is  100  
MW(e).  Most  SMR  models  should  possess  the  ability  to  be  scaled  down  to  the  current  
demand  (should  their  stated  output  exceed  it).  Such  scaling  down  has  taken  place  in  
other  instances.  For  example,  a  Russian  BN-­‐‑350  fast  reactor  in  Kazakhstan  produced  up  
to  135  MW(e)  for  heat  and  desalination  although  the  reactor  was  designed  as  350  
MW(e).  This  ability,  and  the  fact  that  reactors  with  power  outputs  greater  than  300  
MW(e)  are  not  considered  SMRs,  establishes  300  MW(e)  as  an  acceptable  maximum  
requirement.  Thus,  the  possession  of  an  electrical  capacity  within  the  range  of  100  and  
300  MW(e)  is  established  as  a  requirement  for  potential  SMR  models  considered  for  
implementation  in  a  university  setting  in  this  conceptual  design.  	  
3.2  Economics    
In  implementing  an  SMR  in  an  urban  environment  the  cost  of  such  a  
development  is  likely  one  of  the  most  significant  considerations,  other  than  safety,  for  
the  university  pursuing  such  implementation.  However,  given  the  variability  in  
available  resources  and  overall  goals  of  these  entities,  developing  a  concrete  budget  for  
the  construction  and  operation  of  an  SMR  in  this  particular  setting  that  will  serve  as  a  
guideline  for  what  specific  models  may  be  considered  is  not  realistic  at  this  time.  This  
paper,  then,  operates  under  the  assumption  that  an  entity  considering  the  
implementation  of  an  SMR  in  this  type  of  setting  is  committed  to  such  implementation,  
independently  of  the  expected  variation  in  construction  and  operation  costs  for  each  
particular  reactor  model.  Therefore,  a  detailed  economic  analysis  of  each  reactor  model  
will  not  be  considered  in  this  analysis.  It  is  assumed  that  any  entity  considering  
implementation  of  a  SMR  would  develop  a  cost  model  for  the  technology  or  
technologies  under  consideration.    The  input  for  such  a  model  is  yet  to  be  developed.  
However,  what  cost  information  for  each  model  that  is  available,  while  limited,  is  
presented  in  later  sections  discussing  particular  reactor  models.    
   Despite  the  exclusion  of  a  detailed  cost  analysis,  some  basic  statements  can  be  
made  about  the  economics  of  SMR  technology  versus  conventional  large-­‐‑scale  reactors.  
The  capital  investment  associated  with  SMRs  is  generally  much  lower  than  for  
traditional  large-­‐‑scale  plants.  Additionally,  due  to  their  modular  components  and  
factory  fabrication,  construction  costs  and  duration  are  greatly  reduced  compared  to  
large  reactor  construction  [27].  However,  despite  some  initial  benefits  associated  with  
design  simplicity  and  factory  fabrication,  SMRs  do  not  produce  the  same  economies  of  
scale  associated  with  large  reactors.  The  modular  nature  of  these  designs  combat  this  
issue  to  some  extent,  but  only  plants  that  include  multiple  units  benefit  from  such  
economies  of  scale.  Additionally,  the  expectation  is  that  such  plants  construct  
individual  modules  over  time,  meaning  that  economies  of  scale  are  not  experienced  
after  initial  construction,  but  only  after  multiple  modules  are  completed  [4].  
Additionally,  this  modularity  feature  does  not  apply  to  the  situation  examined  in  this  
conceptual  design,  as  a  university  setting  would  only  require  one  unit.  The  complexity  
of  this  issue  contributes  greatly  to  the  lack  of  concrete  predictions  concerning  the  costs  
of  constructing  and  operating  an  SMR.  However,  as  stated  previously,  what  cost  
information  is  available  relevant  to  specific  reactor  models  will  be  presented  in  later  
sections.  
While  specific  SMR  cost  data  is  not  extensive,  various  general  cost  considerations  
relevant  to  potential  implementation  in  an  urban  environment  can  be  examined  to  
determine  whether  any  of  these  considerations  limit  the  overall  feasibility  of  SMR  
implementation  in  this  particular  setting.  One  such  consideration  is  staffing  
requirements.  Given  the  existence  of  an  electricity  producing  plant  on  campus,  current  
plant  staff  could  potentially  take  on  the  additional  duties  associated  with  the  everyday  
operation  of  the  SMR.  Depending  on  the  type  of  reactor  selected,  more  or  less  staff  may  
be  needed,  as  the  different  fuel  cycle  options  possess  varying  requirements  concerning  
refueling  and  waste  disposal.  For  example,  if  a  reactor  with  a  relatively  long  fuel  cycle  is  
selected,  waste  management  will  require  much  less  manpower  than  would  a  reactor  
with  a  shorter  fuel  cycle.  Additionally,  it  can  generally  be  expected  that  more  staff  
would  be  needed  in  a  university-­‐‑based  urban  environment  as  opposed  to  an  offsite  
industry.  However,  the  potential  extra  staff  that  is  required  should  not  serve  as  a  barrier  
to  feasibility  of  implementation  of  an  SMR  in  this  setting.  In  the  event  that  the  current  
cogeneration  plant  is  decommission,  the  staff  required  for  its  daily  operation  could  
simply  be  transferred  to  the  daily  operation  of  the  SMR.    
   Another  relevant  cost  consideration  is  how  the  funding  for  potential  
implementation  will  be  acquired.  While  it  is  assumed  that  the  university  considering  
the  implementation  of  an  SMR  is  committed  to  such  implementation,  independently  of  
the  expected  variation  in  construction  and  operation  costs  for  each  particular  reactor  
model,  it  is  worth  considering  from  where  the  funding  for  such  a  project  will  come.  
Given  the  novelty  of  this  sort  of  ‘new’  technology,  it  could  be  possible  that  federal  
and/or  state  funding  be  provided.  
3.3  Safety    
Arguably  the  most  important  considerations  when  analyzing  the  feasibility  of  
implementing  an  SMR  in  an  urban  setting  are  safety  and  security.  Given  the  proximity  
of  the  reactor  to  the  university  community  and  the  general  public,  additional  safety  
issues  beyond  those  associated  with  the  construction  and  operation  of  typical  nuclear  
reactors  must  be  considered.  This  section  will  discuss  various  factors  associated  with  
ensuring  safety  when  choosing  potential  models  and  when  assessing  the  feasibility  of  
implementing  each  of  these  models.  These  factors  include  (1)  everyday  operational  risks  
given  the  proximity  to  the  university,  (2)  risks  associated  with  the  refueling  process,  (3)  
the  required  emergency  planning  zone  and  its  ‘special’  occupants,  and  (4)  evacuation  
plans.  Additionally,  features  or  requirements  that  the  ideal  model  should  possess,  given  
the  proposed  setting  and  these  four  safety  considerations,  are  identified.  Later,  each  
SMR  model  considered  in  this  paper  will  be  evaluated  for  feasible  implementation  in  
the  proposed  setting  based  on  these  considerations.      
3.3.1  Daily  Operation  
Many  features  typical  of  SMR  models  significantly  reduce  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  
safety  risks  associated  with  the  daily  operation  of  a  nuclear  reactor,  even  given  the  
proximity  to  a  dense  population  that  exists  in  the  proposed  scenario.  Therefore,  
regardless  of  the  particular  model  choice,  some  basic  features  exist  that  establish  each  
SMR  model  as  inherently  safe,  especially  when  compared  to  conventional  larger  
reactors.  One  of  the  most  prominent  of  these  features  is  the  small  nature  of  the  reactor  
itself.  The  source  term  of  a  nuclear  reactor  -­‐‑  the  total  radioactivity  in  the  reactor  core  
that  is  available  for  potential  dispersion  -­‐‑  is  roughly  proportional  to  its  power  level.  
Therefore,  SMRs,  by  definition,  possess  a  reduced  source  term  [14].  Reactor  safety  
essentially  comes  down  to  ensuring  that  a  hazardous  amount  of  radiation  is  not  
released  to  operations  personnel  or  to  the  general  public  [15].  Reduced  source  term  as  a  
result  of  reduced  power  output  significantly  limits  the  amount  of  potential  radiation  
that  could  be  released  in  the  event  of  a  meltdown,  contributing  to  the  enhanced  safety  
of  SMRs.  
Additionally,  most  SMR  models  currently  in  the  design  phase  are  intended  to  be  
housed  entirely  below  grade,  providing  additional  options  for  scramming  and  reducing  
any  potential  exposure.  In  addition  to  enhancing  safety  during  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day  operations,  
such  placement  also  severely  reduces  the  consequences  of  a  worst-­‐‑case  scenario,  as  any  
access  to  the  reactor  could  effectively  be  sealed  off  and  contained.  Thus,  the  risks  of  a  
meltdown  to  nearby  inhabitants  are  reduced  significantly,  as  the  consequences  of  such  
an  event  for  an  SMR  placed  underground  are  less  severe.  Additionally,  such  placement  
reduces  the  consequence  of  various  natural  disasters  such  as  hurricanes  and  tornadoes  
[11].  However,  while  the  below  grade  placement  of  most  SMRs  provides  many  benefits  
in  the  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day,  such  placement  may  not  affect  the  risk  associated  with  other  extreme  
events  such  as  earthquakes  [25].  One  option  to  combat  the  risks  associated  with  an  
earthquake,  is  to  simply  minimize  the  risk  of  earthquakes  by  choosing  a  location  for  the  
reactor  with  very  minimal  seismic  activity.  If  the  reactor  must  be  placed  in  a  location  
with  more  seismic  activity,  another  option  is  to  contain  the  key  reactor  components  
(which  are  generally  housed  within  a  single  vessel)  within  a  pool  of  water,  a  set  up  that  
some  current  models  include  in  their  design.  This  pool  serves  to  dampen  the  effects  of  
earth  movement  and  to  enhance  the  ability  of  the  system  to  withstand  earthquakes  [25].  
Therefore,  whether  by  location  selection  or  by  seismic  zone  design  (or  a  combination  of  
the  two),  the  improbable  but  existing  risk  of  an  earthquake  given  the  underground  
placement  of  the  reactor  can  be  further  minimized.    
As  stated  previously,  many  SMR  model  designs  include  the  main  reactor  
components  within  a  single  vessel.  This  integral  configuration  further  contributes  to  the  
inherent  enhanced  safety  of  SMRs  compared  to  larger  conventional  nuclear  reactors.  
Integral  configuration,  specifically,  refers  to  the  housing  of  the  steam  generators,  
pumps,  pressurizer,  and  reactor  core,  within  a  single,  high  strength  pressure  vessel.  
This  configuration  eliminates  the  necessity  of  large  external  primary  piping,  eliminating  
the  risk  of  a  loss  of  coolant  accident  (LOCA)  caused  by  a  large  break  [25].  The  
probability  and  consequences  of  small  break  LOCAs  are  reduced  due  to  the  decrease  in  
overall  piping  length  associated  with  the  general  SMR  design  [2].  The  presence  of  the  
steam  generators  within  the  vessel  also  serves  as  an  effective  heat  sink  for  decay  heat  
removal  in  a  loss-­‐‑of-­‐‑flow  accident  (LOFA).  A  LOFA  refers  to  the  failure  of  the  coolant  
pump,  which  can  lead  to  a  meltdown  if  the  proper  response  mechanisms  are  not  in  
place.  The  integral  configuration  contributes  to  the  minimization  of  the  risk  of  a  
meltdown  associated  with  a  LOFA  by  providing  an  effective  heat  sink.    
Such  vessels  also  accommodate  relatively  large  pressurized  volumes,  which  
provide  better  control  of  under/overpressure  transients  [15].  Pressure  transients  
describe  a  potential  problem  associated  with  boiling  water  reactors.  In  these  reactors,  an  
increase  in  pressure  as  a  result  of  some  other  disturbance  can  result  in  an  increased  ratio  
of  water  to  steam,  which  in  turn  results  in  increased  neutron  moderation  and  thus,  an  
increased  power  output.  Such  an  increase  can  cause  overheating  and  potential  
meltdown.  Maintaining  appropriate  pressure  levels  is  crucial  to  regulating  the  water  to  
steam  ratio  and  thus,  the  power  output.  The  integral  configuration  provides  better  
control  of  these  transients  and  thus,  of  overall  power  output.  By  minimizing  the  risk  of  
potential  accidents  through  integral  configuration,  SMRs  are  inherently  safer,  further  
contributing  to  the  reduced  everyday  operational  risks.  
Additionally,  smaller  plants  in  general  are  better  able  to  accommodate  heat  
transfer  through  passive  measures.  The  lower  core  operating  power  results  in  a  lower  
decay  power  as  the  total  decay  power  (like  the  source  term)  is  proportional  to  the  
operating  power.  Additionally,  the  smaller  core  volume  enables  more  effective  
conduction  of  this  reduced  decay  power  to  the  reactor  vessel,  as  the  smaller  core  radius  
contributes  to  a  shorter  conduction  path  from  the  core  to  the  reactor  vessel.  Thirdly,  
smaller  systems  are  more  effective  at  removing  heat  from  the  external  surface  area  of  
the  vessel.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  decay  power  is  proportional  to  the  core  
volume,  which  varies  as  a  cube  of  the  effective  core  radius.  Alternatively,  heat  removal  
from  the  exterior  surface  of  the  vessel  is  proportional  to  the  surface  area  of  the  vessel,  
which  varies  with  the  square  of  the  core  radius.  Thus,  as  the  power  level  is  reduced,  the  
volume  of  the  core  decreases  more  quickly  than  the  surface  area,  meaning  that  the  
relative  efficiency  of  external  heat  removal  is  improved.  The  result  is  that  most  SMRs  
possess  the  ability  to  easily  achieve  decay  heat  removal  using  fully  passive,  natural  
convection  air  or  water  circulation  systems  [15].  This  enhances  the  safety  aspect  of  
SMRs  compared  to  conventional  reactors  and  contributes  to  the  overall  design  
simplicity.    
Given  the  improved  safety  of  SMRs  over  traditional  large  scale  reactors,  few  
requirements  for  potential  models  associated  with  minimizing  everyday  operation  risks  
can  be  specified  beyond  the  required  below  grade  location,  passive  safety  features  and  
integral  configuration.  Since  these  are  common,  if  not  inherent,  characteristics  of  SMRs  
currently  under  development,  these  requirements  are  easily  achieved.  This  suggests  
that  the  feasibility  of  the  implementation  of  an  SMR  in  the  proposed  environment  will  
not  be  limited  by  requirements  associated  with  reducing  daily  operation  risks.  
Additionally,  most  universities  possess  institutional  safety  programs,  such  as  an  
Environmental  Health  and  Safety  department  or  a  Radiation  Safety  Office;  either  such  
entity  could  monitor  the  daily  operation  of  the  SMR  to  further  enhance  the  overall  
safety  of  its  daily  operation.      
3.3.2  Refueling  
While  the  safety  benefits  associated  with  the  daily  operation  of  SMRs  are  
promising,  they  lose  significance  when  the  core  must  be  removed  for  refueling.  
Therefore,  a  key  characteristic  when  considering  potential  SMR  models  for  
implementation  is  core  lifetime.  Ideally,  the  refuel  period  of  the  core  would  be  as  long  
as  possible,  so  as  to  limit  risks  associated  with  the  refueling  process.  Current  models  
possess  refuel  periods  anywhere  from  two  to  sixty  years  and  significant  differences  
exist  concerning  the  deployment  schedule  for  reactors  on  either  end  of  this  spectrum,  
which  must  also  be  considered.  Therefore,  the  ideal  reactor  model  for  this  set  up  would  
posses  the  longest  possible  refueling  period  and  be  planned  for  deployment  within  the  
next  twenty  years.  However,  given  that  this  conceptual  design  is  intended  for  future  
SMR  implementation  planning  (as  opposed  to  immediate  use),  deployment  scheduling  
considerations  should  not  outweigh  refuel  period  when  considering  potential  models  
for  implementation  in  the  proposed  scenario.  The  safety  benefits  associated  with  a  long  
refuel  period  far  outweigh  any  benefits  associated  with  minimal  differences  in  
deployment  schedules  over  the  next  ten  to  twenty  years.  
Additionally,  depending  on  the  type  of  reactor,  different  refueling  methods  may  
be  required.  For  example,  in  some  of  the  potential  fast  reactor  designs,  the  entire  core  
itself  might  be  replaced,  which  would  require  vastly  different  refuel  methods  from  a  
reactor  that  has  part  of  its  core  removed  and  replaced  more  often.  Ideally,  a  SMR  design  
that  involves  full  removal  and  replacement  of  the  core  once  after  a  relatively  long  
period  of  time  will  be  chosen  for  implementation.  Other  specifics  regarding  refuel  
methods  and  the  associated  safety  issues  will  be  discussed  in  later  sections  regarding  
the  technology  of  specific  potential  designs.    
3.3.3  Emergency  Planning  Zone  (EPZ)  
Despite  safety  enhancements  inherent  to  the  small  modular  design,  specific  
critical  guidelines  concerning  the  emergency  planning  zone  must  still  be  detailed.  Since  
no  SMR  has  yet  been  implemented  in  such  a  setting,  there  is  no  precedent  for  the  
required  emergency  planning  zone.  Typically,  the  NRC  defines  two  zones  around  each  
nuclear  plant,  the  exact  size  and  configuration  of  which  vary  depending  on  specific  
plant  characteristics.  Typically,  the  Plume  Exposure  Pathway  EPZ  has  a  radius  of  
approximately  ten  miles  and  includes  areas  where  there  could  be  an  exposure  of  
radioactive  materials  [7].  In  the  event  of  an  emergency,  those  located  in  the  area  
contained  within  this  pathway  could  experience  exposure  from  plume  inhalation  that  
exceeds  EPA  Protective  Action  Guides  (PAGs).  As  a  result,  the  Plume  Exposure  Path  is  
subject  to  predetermined  protective  action  plans  designed  to  avoid  or  reduce  exposure  
to  radioactive  materials.  Protective  actions  include  but  are  not  limited  to  respiratory  
protection,  sheltering  in-­‐‑place,  or  evacuation  [35].  The  Ingestion  Exposure  Pathway  EPZ  
has  a  radius  of  about  fifty  miles  from  the  reactor  site  and  is  identified  to  prevent  
potentially  contaminated  food,  water,  and  vegetation  from  being  consumed.  
While  the  inherent  safety  features  of  SMRs  surely  justify  the  consideration  of  a  
reduced  EPZ,  the  closer  proximity  to  a  large  concentration  of  people  must  also  be  
considered.  According  to  the  US  DOE,  there  is  potential  for  a  significant  reduction  in  
the  EPZ  for  SMRs  [21].  Proponents  or  SMRs  advocate  for  a  reduction  of  the  Plume  
Exposure  Pathway  EPZ  from  ten  miles  to  as  little  as  half  a  mile,  or  approximately  805  
meters  [1].  The  World  Nuclear  Association  argues  for  even  further  reduction,  stating  
that  the  EPZ  required  for  SMRs  is  designed  to  be  no  more  than  about  300  meters  in  
radius,  given  the  safety  enhancements  discussed  previously  [29],  [28].  Consider  the  
placement  of  an  SMR  according  to  the  scenario  outlined  in  this  paper,  in  the  center  of  a  
highly  populated  dense  urban  area,  such  as  a  university.  Even  if  an  EPZ  of  half  a  mile  
(the  more  modest  reduction)  is  established  for  this  reactor,  only  a  very  small  portion  of  
the  campus  or  urban  area  would  require  extensive  emergency  plans  in  the  event  of  a  
radiological  emergency.  Figure  1  depicts  a  one  half-­‐‑mile  radius  around  the  current  
cogeneration  facility  at  the  model  university,  demonstrating  the  relatively  small  portion  
of  the  university  community  that  would  be  affected  in  the  unlikely  event  of  an  
emergency.  Thus,  given  the  enhanced  safety  features  associated  with  SMRs  and  the  
resulting  expected  reduction  in  required  EPZ,  the  feasibility  of  implementing  such  a  
reactor  in  this  type  of  urban  center  is  clearly  feasible.    
  
















3.3.4  Evacuation  Plans    
Despite  the  apparent  feasibility  of  such  implementation  given  EPZ  reduction  
estimates  for  SMRs,  the  evacuation  plans  relevant  to  the  areas  within  the  determined  
EPZ  must  be  tailored  to  the  specific  environment  being  considered.  The  conceptual  site  
for  the  implementation  of  an  SMR  in  this  study  is  a  university  setting  that  produces  a  
portion  of  its  electricity  demand  at  an  on-­‐‑campus  plant.  In  the  case  of  conventional,  
large  scale  nuclear  reactors,  state  and  local  agencies  are  required  to  develop  detailed  
evacuation  plans  for  populations  within  the  ten-­‐‑mile  EPZ.  Such  plans  include  various  
scenarios  that  consider  variables  such  as  time  of  day,  weather  conditions,  season,  and  
population  characteristics  (i.e.  whether  the  population  is  ‘general’  or  if  it  includes  
special  facilities  such  as  schools  and  hospitals).  These  plans  and  evacuation  time  
estimates  are  required  to  be  updated  periodically  to  reflect  changes  in  population  and  
the  transportation  networks  [9].    
   Since  such  implementation  is  unprecedented,  there  is  no  model  evacuation  plan  
for  the  community  surrounding  the  intended  SMR.  Additionally,  the  anticipated  
reduction  in  required  EPZ  affects  the  group  of  people  affected  by  the  evacuation  plan,  
which  has  implications  for  the  content  of  the  plan  itself.  Given  these  factors,  various  
evacuation  plans  associated  with  reactors  located  near  special  facilities  (preferably  
schools),  as  opposed  to  a  general  population,  should  be  examined  and  adjusted  based  
on  the  enhanced  safety  features  of  an  SMR  and  for  the  close  proximity  of  the  reactor  to  
the  surrounding  community.  Additionally,  such  an  evacuation  plan  should  include  
considerations  specific  to  a  university  setting.  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  
develop  specific  evacuation  plans,  as  the  setting  in  question  simply  serves  as  a  model  
for  the  implementation  feasibility  analysis,  and  a  specific  evaluation  plan  would  not  be  
applicable  to  other  universities  considering  such  implementation.  However,  the  
purpose  of  discussing  the  evacuation  plan  associated  with  the  proposed  
implementation  is  to  determine  whether  evacuation  plan  considerations  limit  the  
feasibility  of  the  overall  proposed  implementation  or  impose  any  restrictions  on  the  
particular  type  of  model  that  can  be  realistically  selected.  
One  consideration  specific  to  the  university  setting  that  must  be  considered  is  the  
fact  that  a  large  portion  of  the  affected  population  will  be  students,  many  of  whom  will  
reside  on  campus.  Therefore,  adequate  plans  must  be  laid  out  as  to  where  these  
students  will  be  sent  in  the  unlikely  event  that  evacuation  of  the  area  surrounding  the  
reactor  must  take  place.  Given  the  unlikely  nature  of  such  an  event,  as  well  as  the  
existence  of  possibilities  for  relocation  of  students,  this  consideration  does  not  serve  as  a  
limitation  to  the  feasibility  of  the  implementation  of  an  SMR  in  this  scenario.    
   An  additional  effect  of  the  nature  of  the  urban  setting  on  the  required  evacuation  
plan  is  the  issue  of  increased  traffic.  The  conceptual  setting  is  defined  as  “urban,”  
meaning  that,  by  definition,  a  greater  number  of  people  will  surround  and  thus  be  
potentially  affected  by  the  SMR.  In  the  event  that  the  area  surrounding  the  reactor  must  
be  evacuated,  the  evacuation  will  involve  a  greater  number  of  people  than  is  usually  
involved  in  the  evacuation  of  an  area  surrounding  a  large-­‐‑scale  reactor.  The  fact  that  the  
EPZ  is  expected  to  be  much  smaller  in  the  case  of  an  SMR  slightly  modifies  this  issue,  
but  even  in  the  best  case  EPZ  reduction  scenario,  some  of  the  university  population  will  
need  to  be  evacuated.  Additionally,  it  must  be  anticipated  that  when  the  parents  of  
students  residing  outside  of  the  EPZ  learn  of  any  evacuation,  they  will  surely  assume  
the  worst-­‐‑case  scenario  and  insist  their  child  be  evacuated  as  well.  These  considerations  
combined  result  in  a  scenario  in  which  a  very  large  number  of  people  are  attempting  to  
evacuate  an  already  congested  area,  resulting  in  severe  traffic.  Such  an  issue  must  be  
accounted  for  in  the  evacuation  plan  itself,  but  also  in  the  way  that  information  is  
presented  to  students  and  their  parents.  The  latter  will  be  discussed  more  thoroughly  in  
section  3.9  Public  Reception.  This  issue  lends  itself  to  a  potential  site  restriction  when  it  
comes  to  the  overall  feasibility  of  the  implementation  of  an  SMR  in  the  conceptual  
setting.  Ideally,  divided  highways  would  lead  out  of  the  university  area  and  connect  
quickly  to  an  Interstate  highway.  This  requirement  is  achieved  for  the  particular  model  
site,  the  University  of  North  Carolina.    
   An  evacuation  plan  for  a  nuclear  reactor  in  an  urban  setting  certainly  requires  
some  additional  considerations,  although  none  of  these  would  negatively  affect  the  
feasibility  of  the  potential  implementation  of  an  SMR.    Only  one  factor  (enhanced  
traffic)  could,  if  an  adequate  network  of  roads  was  not  available,  actually  affect  the  
potential  implementation,  by  limiting  specific  site  selection.  Additionally,  none  of  the  
above  considerations  has  a  direct  effect  on  the  specific  models  being  considered.    
3.4  Security    
While  ensuring  the  safety  of  those  near  the  reactor  is  of  paramount  importance,  
minimizing  proliferation  risk  and  maximizing  security  are  also  crucial  considerations  
relevant  to  the  potential  implementation  of  any  nuclear  reactor.  As  with  safety,  the  
underground  placement  of  the  reactor  contributes  significantly  to  increased  security.  
Therefore,  by  design,  all  SMRs  intended  for  below  ground  implementation  (which  
includes  most  currently  in  the  design  phase)  are  inherently  more  secure  than  their  
larger  counterparts.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  such  placement  reduces  the  
consequence  of  severe  events  such  as  aircraft  impact  [11].  Additionally,  this  set  up  
provides  a  secure  place  in  many  types  of  SMR  designs  -­‐‑  particularly  light  water  SMRs  -­‐‑  
to  house  spent  fuel  before  it  is  transported  to  its  final  destination,  reducing  proliferation  
risk  of  the  reactor  [25],  [16].      
   Additionally,  the  long  operating  cycle  requirement  imposed  for  enhanced  safety,  
also  contributes  to  heightened  security.  The  longer  the  fuel  cycle,  the  less  often  fresh  
fuel  will  have  to  be  loaded  into  the  reactor  and  the  less  often  spent  fuel  will  have  to  be  
unloaded.  Both  of  these  activities  provide  opportunities  for  potential  proliferation,  so  
the  minimization  of  their  occurrences  greatly  improves  the  security  of  the  plant.  Fast  
reactors  in  particular  benefit  from  such  a  long  lifetime,  as  the  phases  most  susceptible  to  
fissile  material  diversion  -­‐‑  new  fuel,  routine  spent  fuel  handling,  and  out  of  reactor  fuel  
storage  -­‐‑  are  non-­‐‑existent  at  a  fast  reactor  plant  site  [3].  Additionally,  many  SMRs  are  
designed  to  operate  without  any  partial  refueling,  meaning  that,  during  refuel  periods,  
the  entire  core  is  removed  and  replaced,  which  further  reduces  the  exposure  of  the  core,  
resulting  in  heightened  security.    
   Specific  features  associated  with  different  types  of  reactors  also  contribute  to  
improved  security  for  nuclear  reactors  in  general  as  reactors  with  different  coolant  
types  tend  to  possess  their  own  particular  security  benefits.  For  example,  many  water-­‐‑
cooled  SMRs  employ  low  enrichment  uranium,  which  is  less  favorable  for  proliferation.  
They  also  include  an  unattractive  isotopic  composition  of  the  plutonium  in  the  
discharged  fuel,  and  radiation  barriers  provided  by  the  spent  fuel,  which  further  lessens  
proliferation  risks  [19].  Additionally,  there  are  intrinsic  proliferation  resistance  features  
common  to  all  high-­‐‑temperature  gas  cooled  reactors  (HTGRs).  Some  of  these  features  
include  high  fuel  burn-­‐‑up  (low  residual  inventory  of  plutonium,  high  content  of  Pu-­‐‑
240),  a  difficult  to  process  fuel  matrix,  radiation  barriers,  and  a  low  ratio  of  fissile  to  
fuel-­‐‑bloc/fuel-­‐‑pebble  mass  [19].  Liquid  metal  cooled  reactors  also  possess  features  that  
establish  them  as  secure  by  design.  Liquid  metal  cooled  reactors  are  fast  reactors  that  
can  ensure  a  self-­‐‑sustainable  operation  on  fissile  materials  or  realize  fuel  breeding  to  
feed  other  reactors  present  in  nuclear  energy  systems  [19].  If  the  fuel  cycle  is  closed,  
then  for  both  of  these  cases  the  need  of  fuel  enrichment  and  relevant  uranium  
enrichment  facilities  is  eliminated,  thus  contributing  to  enhanced  proliferation  
resistance.  Additionally,  fast  reactors  in  general  involve  no  separation  of  plutonium  and  
uranium  at  any  fuel  cycle  stage  and  leave  only  a  small  fraction  of  fission  products  
permanently  in  the  fuel  [19].  Therefore,  given  the  security  features  associated  with  each  
different  type  of  reactor  (in  terms  of  coolant),  as  well  as  the  enhanced  security  features  
associated  with  small  modular  reactor  models  in  general,  any  reactor  model  chosen  will  
possess  more  than  adequate  proliferation  resistance.  As  a  result,  no  unusual  or  
additional  requirements  for  the  chosen  model  must  be  met  when  it  comes  to  plant  
security,  given  the  enhanced  secure  nature  of  small  modular  reactors  in  particular.    
3.5  Inconveniences    
As  the  potential  SMR  will  be  implemented  in  a  highly  populated  urban  area,  
potential  nuisance  considerations  must  be  considered  that  are  not  necessarily  applicable  
to  the  implementation  of  a  large-­‐‑scale  reactor  in  the  traditional  remote  location.  A  
potential  inconvenience  associated  with  the  implementation  of  any  power  plant  is  the  
noise  produced  by  power  production.  Generally,  noise  associated  with  power  plants  is  
a  result  of  the  operation  of  the  turbines  and  generators,  both  of  which  are,  in  this  
scenario,  components  of  the  existing  power  plant.  The  noise  associated  with  these  
systems,  however,  does  not  currently  serve  as  a  significant  nuisance  in  the  cogeneration  
setup.  While  the  SMR  system  would  also  include  a  steam  turbine  and  generator,  the  
noise  associated  with  these  components  would  be  even  less  than  the  noise  produced  by  
the  existing  set  up.  This  is  because,  in  the  SMR  design,  these  components  are  housed  
underground  and  within  a  containment  vessel  as  part  of  the  integral  design.  Therefore,  
the  noise  associated  with  the  implementation  of  an  SMR  in  conjunction  with  an  existing  
electrical  generation  facility  in  an  urban  environment  would  be  minimal,  if  at  all  
noticeable.    
3.6  Waste  Disposal    
Another  important  consideration  when  determining  the  feasibility  of  
implementation  of  an  SMR  in  the  given  scenario,  as  well  as  appropriate  potential  
models,  is  waste  disposal.  Given  the  urban  environment  in  question,  space  limitations  
exist  for  the  implementation  of  an  SMR  in  this  setting  that  do  not  exist  for  the  
implementation  of  a  reactor  in  more  remote  locations.    
Generally,  used  fuel  from  the  core  of  a  nuclear  reactor  is  stored  for  several  years  
under  water  in  cooling  ponds  on  the  reactor  site.  These  concrete  ponds  as  well  as  the  
water  covering  the  spent  fuel  assemblies  provide  radiation  protection  and  remove  heat  
generated  during  radioactive  decay.  Final  disposal  of  this  waste  is  delayed  a  certain  
number  of  years,  depending  on  the  level  of  the  waste.  For  example,  disposal  of  high-­‐‑
level  waste,  such  as  the  used  fuel  itself,  is  delayed  anywhere  from  forty  to  fifty  years  to  
allow  its  radioactivity  to  decay.  After  this  amount  of  time,  less  than  one  thousandth  of  
its  initial  radioactivity  remains,  and  it  is  much  easier  to  handle.  Final  disposal  of  nuclear  
wastes  requires  their  isolation  from  the  environment  for  long  periods  of  time.  Burying  
the  waste  in  stable  geological  formations  appears  to  be  the  most  favorable  method  [29].  
In  1987,  the  Yucca  Mountain  Nuclear  Waste  Repository  was  designated  by  the  Nuclear  
Waste  Policy  Act  (NWPA)  Amendments  as  the  deep  geological  repository  storage  
facility  for  spent  nuclear  fuel  and  other  high  level  radioactive  waste.  However,  in  2010,  
federal  funding  for  the  Yucca  Mountain  nuclear  waste  repository  site  ended,  leaving  no  
designated  long  term  storage  site  for  high  level  radioactive  wastes.  Since  then,  the  issue  
continues  to  be  debated  and  a  final  decision  concerning  the  designation  of  the  site  has  
yet  to  be  made  [37].    
This  essentially  means  that,  should  an  SMR  be  implemented  according  to  this  
concept  design  in  the  near  future,  used  fuel  will  not  be  transported  off  site  until  the  
federal  government  designates  a  long-­‐‑term  storage  site.  This  does  not  serve  as  a  
limitation  to  implementation,  however,  as  used  fuel  must  be  stored  for  decades  before  
being  transported  to  a  long-­‐‑term  storage  site.  Many  SMR  models,  notably  LWR  models,  
include  the  storage  of  spent  fuel  in  underground  pools  as  part  of  its  design  [25],  [16].  
Additionally,  since  the  output  of  any  reactor  implemented  in  this  setting  will  be  much  
smaller  than  conventional  large-­‐‑scale  reactors,  less  waste  will  be  produced.  There  will  
be  less  high-­‐‑level  waste  as  a  result  of  fission,  and  less  medium-­‐‑  and  low-­‐‑level  wastes  as  
a  result  of  operations  including  the  cleaning  of  reactor  cooling  systems  and  the  
decontamination  of  equipment  [29].  However,  the  urban  nature  of  the  setting  in  which  
this  reactor  will  be  located  does  pose  some  constraints  on  space  availability  for  plant  
components,  such  as  the  storage  pools.  Therefore,  a  key  consideration  of  the  specific  
feasibility  of  implementation  of  an  SMR  in  particular  settings  will  depend  on  the  space  
available  within  the  urban  setting,  as  well  as  the  amount  of  space  required  to  house  
particular  reactor  types.  Therefore,  this  consideration  only  outlines  specific  
requirements  for  potential  models  when  the  amount  of  space  available  is  known.  For  
the  purposes  of  this  concept  design,  models  that  require  less  space  relative  to  other  
models  will  be  considered  first,  but  this  consideration  will  not  be  interpreted  as  strictly  
as  others,  given  the  variability  associated  with  space  availability.  Typical  SMR  vessels  
measure,  on  average,  approximately  23  meters  in  height  and  4.5  meters  in  diameter,  
which  is  not  anticipated  to  serve  as  a  major  limitation  to  feasibility  of  implementation  in  
most  university  settings  [29].  Specific  spatial  information  will  be  presented,  as  it  is  
available,  in  later  sections  discussing  particular  reactor  types.    
3.7  Integration  with  Current  Cogeneration  Setup  
   A  distinct  quality  of  the  proposed  setting  is  the  existing  presence  of  a  
cogeneration  facility  on  the  campus  being  considered.  Such  existence  improves  the  
feasibility  of  implementing  an  SMR  in  many  ways,  as  it  means  that  the  infrastructure  
required  to  transport  the  electrical  and  thermal  energy  supplied  by  the  reactor  is  
already  in  place.  Additionally,  the  existence  of  the  cogeneration  plant  provides  
enhanced  reliance  to  the  SMR  itself;  in  the  unlikely  event  of  a  required  shutdown,  the  
original  plant  can  continue  to  provide  electricity  to  the  surrounding  areas.  Ideally,  the  
coal-­‐‑fired  plant  would  eventually  be  decommissioned,  meaning  this  benefit  would  
eventually  be  irrelevant.  There  is  potential  to  also  utilize  the  currently  existing  
generator,  but  as  most  SMR  designs  include  this  within  the  integral  vessel,  such  
utilization  is  unlikely.  Overall,  the  existence  of  the  existing  plant  provides  significant  
benefits  when  it  comes  to  energy  distribution,  as  current  infrastructure  can  be  utilized  
and  the  construction  requirements  are  reduced  overall.  Thus,  this  consideration  
involves  no  particular  restrictions  or  requirements  for  potential  SMR  model  or  site  
selection.    
3.8  Emissions    
In  general,  an  operating  nuclear  power  plant  has  near-­‐‑zero  carbon  emissions,  as  
the  only  outputs  are  heat  and  radioactive  waste.  However,  other  steps  involved  in  the  
eventual  production  and  use  of  nuclear  energy  contribute  to  an  overall  carbon  footprint  
of  a  nuclear  plant.  These  processes  however,  contribute  to  fewer  total  emissions  
associated  with  the  lifecycle  of  a  conventional  large-­‐‑scale  reactor  than  are  generally  
produced  over  the  lifecycle  of  a  coal-­‐‑fired  plant.  In  fact,  existing  nuclear  plants  prevent  
approximately  681  million  tonnes  of  carbon  from  being  emitted  each  year  in  the  US  
alone  [30].  Through  the  consideration  of  twenty  of  the  most  reliable  life  cycle  
assessments  of  currently  operating  nuclear  reactors,  Benjamin  Sovacool  found1  that  the  
total  life  cycle  carbon  emissions  of  a  nuclear  plant  are  estimated  at  a  range  of  1.4  grams  
of  carbon  dioxide  equivalent  per  kilowatt-­‐‑hour  (gCO2e/kWh)  of  electricity  produced  up  
to  288  gCO2e/kWh  [31].  This  large  variation  of  emissions  can  be  explained  by  the  
different  methodologies  used  in  the  individual  assessments;  however,  a  mean  of  66  
gCO2e/kWh  is  generally  considered  to  be  a  reasonable  approximation.  The  World  
Nuclear  Association  completed  a  similar  analysis  assessing  the  greenhouse  gas  
emissions  produced  by  various  forms  of  electricity  generation.  The  results  are  
summarized  in  Figure  2,  and  demonstrate  that  generating  electricity  from  fossil  fuels  
results  in  greenhouse  gas  emissions  far  higher  than  associated  with  nuclear  generation  
[12].  
                                                                                                 
1  in  his  2008  study  entitled  "ʺValuing  the  Greenhouse  Gas  Emissions  from  Nuclear  Power:  A  
Critical  Survey,"ʺ    
  























Even  on  the  high  end  of  the  range  established  by  Sovacool,  current  emissions  
from  nuclear  plants  are  well  below  the  emissions  associated  with  scrubbed  coal-­‐‑fired  
plants,  which  emit,  on  average,  960  gCO2e/kWh.  Additionally,  the  1.4  to  288  
gCO2e/kWh  range  and  the  66  gCO2e/kWh  average  represent  emissions  associated  with  
various  processes  other  than  daily  operation  in  the  lifecycle  of  a  large  scale  nuclear  
plant  (since  operational  emissions  are  near  zero).  Therefore,  the  potential  total  
emissions  from  an  SMR  are  already  expected  to  be  much  lower,  as  many  of  these  
processes  are  scaled  down  for  an  SMR.  According  to  Sovacool’s  life  cycle  assessment  
study,  the  largest  source  of  carbon  emissions,  which  accounts  for  38  percent  of  the  
average  total,  is  the  frontend  of  the  fuel  cycle.  This  includes  the  mining  and  milling  
processes  for  uranium  ore,  and  the  relatively  energy-­‐‑intensive  conversion  and  
enrichment  processes  [31].  Since  less  overall  uranium  is  required  for  SMRs,  the  
processes  associated  with  its  preparation  are  reduced,  and  emissions  associated  with  
the  frontend  of  the  fuel  cycle  are  lower  relative  to  large-­‐‑scale  reactors.  Additionally,  
some  of  the  proposed  SMR  technologies  allow  the  reactor  to  utilize  spent  fuel  as  a  
portion  of  the  required  fuel  component,  further  reducing  the  mining  and  milling  
requirements  associated  with  the  use  of  uranium  ore.  Should  such  a  reactor  be  chosen  
for  implementation,  the  emissions  associated  with  fuel  utilization  are  reduced  even  
further  [13],  [8].    
Despite  a  potential  reduced  demand  for  uranium  ore,  the  sustainability  of  the  
uranium  supply  itself  is  still  a  consideration.  Good  quality  uranium  ore  is  becoming  
more  difficult  to  procure,  as  the  deposits  of  rich  ores  with  the  highest  uranium  content  
are  being  depleted.  This  leaves  only  lower  quality  deposits  left  to  be  mined.  As  ore  
quality  degrades,  more  energy  is  required  to  mine  and  mill  it  and  resulting  greenhouse  
gas  emissions  increase  [30].  However,  the  reduction  in  uranium  ore  requirements  
associated  with  the  overall  smaller  size  of  SMRs,  as  well  as  the  ability  of  some  models  to  
utilize  spent  fuel,  combats  this  issue  and  contributes  to  an  overall  significant  potential  
reduction  in  emissions  associated  with  fuel  procurement  compared  to  large  reactors.    
Other  key  contributors  to  the  total  emissions  associated  with  traditional  nuclear  
reactors  are  construction  (12  percent),  operation  (17  percent  due  to  use  of  backup  
generators  using  fossil  fuels  during  downtime),  fuel  processing  and  waste  disposal  (14  
percent)  and  decommissioning  (18  percent)  [31].  All  of  these  represent  processes  that  
are  scaled  down  when  applied  to  an  SMR.  For  example,  construction  needs  associated  
with  SMRs  are  drastically  reduced  compared  to  large  reactors.  This  is  a  result  of  the  
overall  reduced  size  of  the  reactor,  as  well  as  the  ability  to  fabricate  the  majority  of  the  
reactor  components  in  a  factory  setting,  where  processes  can  be  streamlined  and  
efficiency  can  be  maximized.  The  result  is  an  expected  reduction  in  emissions  associated  
with  SMRs  compared  to  conventional  reactors.  Similarly,  emissions  associated  with  the  
operation  of  any  SMR  will  be  lower,  as  the  total  output  of  the  reactor  is  lower.  Fuel  
processing  and  waste  disposal  emissions  are  also  anticipated  to  be  reduced  for  SMRs  
since  less  overall  waste  will  be  produced  and,  ideally,  more  waste  will  be  utilized  by  
other  SMRs  that  possess  the  ability  to  run  off  of  spent  fuel.  Decommissioning  emissions  
will  also  be  lower  given  the  smaller  size  of  the  reactors.    
It  is  worth  noting  that,  despite  some  major  reductions  in  the  emissions  associated  
with  fuel  procurement,  construction  emissions  may  not  be  as  dramatically  decreased  
overall  when  compared  to  the  emissions  associated  with  large-­‐‑scale  reactors  in  general.  
This  is  largely  due  to  the  modular  nature  of  SMRs.  While  the  intended  implementation  
in  this  concept  design  involves  a  single  unit,  it  is  anticipated  that  the  future  general  
implementation  of  SMR  technology  involves  a  greater  number  of  total  units  in  service.  
This  would  result  in  enhanced  emissions  associated  with  the  construction  of  these  units.  
However,  given  the  scope  of  this  study,  the  overall  emissions  produced  by  the  
individual  university  seeking  SMR  implementation  will  be  reduced  in  the  long  run.  
Despite  some  initial  emissions  associated  with  the  construction  of  the  SMR  and,  
potentially,  fuel  processing,  the  university  will  produce  less  overall  total  emissions  by  
relying  less  (and  ideally  eventually  not  at  all)  on  energy  produced  by  higher  emitting  
processes,  such  as  coal  burning.      
3.9  Public  Reception    
Given  both  the  lack  of  precedent  for  the  proposed  set  up,  as  well  as  concerns  
held  by  a  significant  segment  of  the  public  regarding  safety  and  waste  disposal,  an  
intensive  public  relations  program  would  likely  be  needed  before  the  SMR  could  
operate  regularly.  While  this  consideration  does  not  necessarily  affect  specific  
requirements  for  the  ideal  model,  issues  associated  with  public  reception  of  the  
implementation  of  an  SMR  in  the  proposed  setting  certainly  affect  the  feasibility  of  
overall  implementation,  regardless  of  the  specific  model.  Such  implementation  may  be  
feasible  as  far  as  every  other  consideration,  but  without  widespread  public  support,  
such  a  project  could  not  take  place.  Therefore,  assessing  the  most  common  views  and  
opinions  of  the  public  when  it  comes  to  nuclear  energy  and  determining  the  
appropriate  way  to  address  significant  misgivings,  if  possible,  will  be  necessary  for  
successful  implementation  of  an  SMR  in  the  urban  setting  proposed.    
   According  to  recent  studies,  solid  majorities  of  the  public  continue  to  oppose  the  
construction  of  more  nuclear  plants  [24].  The  most  common  concerns  Americans  
possess  regarding  nuclear  energy  include  qualms  about  (1)  the  release  of  radioactivity,  
(2)  potential  catastrophic  events,  (3)  waste  disposal,  (4)  thermal  water  pollution,  (5)  fear  
of  explosions,  (6)  operation  risks.  Waste  disposal  in  particular  has  been  a  key  obstacle  
(in  addition  to  safety  concerns)  to  the  social  acceptability  of  nuclear  power  [17].  This  
issue  is  only  exacerbated  by  the  cancellation  of  funding  for  the  Yucca  Mountain  
repository  site.           
The  fact  that  the  community  surrounding  this  potential  SMR  is  made  up  largely  
of  university  students  and  professionals  may  lead  one  to  believe  that  the  overall  
affected  community  possesses  a  significantly  higher  level  of  knowledge  about  nuclear  
energy.  Since  several  studies  suggest  that  the  more  people  understand  about  nuclear  
energy,  the  more  they  tend  to  support  it,  such  knowledge  would  suggest  a  more  
positive  opinion  of  nuclear  energy  among  this  community  [17].  However,  the  reality  is  
that  people  in  general  are  severely  lacking  in  knowledge  about  nuclear  energy,  
including  university  communities  [18].  Thus,  any  educational  campaign  must  focus  on  
the  facts  surrounding  nuclear  energy  in  general,  in  addition  to  the  specific  benefits  and  
safety  qualifications  of  the  implemented  SMR.  Since  the  majority  of  the  affected  
population  will  be  university  students  and  professionals,  such  a  fact-­‐‑driven  educational  
campaign  is  likely  to  be  well  received.  It  should  also  address  the  six  main  fears  listed  
above,  many  of  which  are  directly  addressed  by  SMR  technology.  With  an  increase  in  
knowledge  about  nuclear  energy,  particularly  SMRs,  as  well  as  the  presentation  of  
information  that  directly  addresses  the  most  commonly  held  fears,  the  overall  opinion  
of  nuclear  energy  among  the  affected  community  should  be  improved.       
Despite  the  logical  and  demonstrated  link  between  improved  knowledge  and  
improved  opinion  of  nuclear  energy,  this  cannot  be  the  only  facet  of  the  interaction  with  
the  public  concerning  the  potential  SMR.  While  numerous  public  surveys  have  
demonstrated  a  clear  connection  between  level  of  knowledge  concerning  nuclear  energy  
and  a  more  positive  opinion,  these  findings  are  not  universal.  A  few  studies  suggest  a  
more  tenuous  link  between  level  of  education  and  support  for  nuclear  energy  [17].  
Differences  in  these  findings  are  likely  a  result  in  various  knowledge  acquisition  
methods.  For  instance,  surveys  involving  media  as  a  mode  of  knowledge  acquisition  
likely  produced  smaller  changes  in  support  than  did  surveys  involving  more  objective  
sources  of  information.  Regardless,  garnering  support  for  the  intended  SMR  
implementation  cannot  be  achieved  purely  through  educational  means.  An  additional  
element  of  the  public  campaign  should  include,  after  the  initial  education  program,  a  
means  by  which  the  community  can  voice  specific  fears  or  concerns  and  receive  helpful  
responses.  This  could  potentially  require  a  small  team  of  professionals  available  to  
provide  such  assistance  during  the  initial  operation  of  the  SMR,  assuming  public  
opinion  reaches  a  level  such  that  implementation  can  take  place.    
In  general,  it  can  be  assumed  that,  with  the  appropriate  educational  campaign,  
public  opinion  should  reach  a  level  such  that  implementation  of  the  SMR  in  the  
university  setting  can  take  place  without  significant  objection.  Therefore,  this  
consideration  serves  as  more  of  a  guideline  for  how  to  achieve  successful  
implementation,  rather  than  a  potential  restriction  to  the  feasibility  of  implementation.      
3.10  Summary  of  Requirements  
In  the  above  sections,  the  feasibility  of  implementing  a  small  modular  nuclear  
reactor  in  an  urban  setting  was  evaluated  based  on  various  considerations.  Through  this  
evaluation,  certain  key  requirements  associated  with  potential  implementation  were  
determined.  These  requirements  include  those  relevant  to  the  specific  choice  of  reactor  
model,  as  well  as  those  pertinent  to  the  eventual  site  selection  for  the  chosen  SMR  
model.    
3.10.1  Requirements  Specific  to  Model  
Feasible  implementation  of  an  SMR  in  the  proposed  setting  requires  that  the  
selected  model  be  designed  for  an  output  of  between  100  and  300  MWe  and  
implemented  below  ground,  as  most  SMRs  currently  in  the  design  phase  are  intended  
to  be.  Additionally,  the  chosen  SMR  model  should  possess  integral  configuration  to  
provide  enhanced  safety,  another  feature  common  to  almost  all  SMR  models.  If  
possible,  to  minimize  consequences  of  any  potential  seismic  activity,  the  design  should  
include  key  reactor  elements  within  a  pool  of  water.  A  refuel  period  of  at  least  five  
years  is  required,  to  minimize  risks  associated  with  handling  fuel.  Additionally,  the  core  
of  an  ideal  reactor  would  be  fully  removed  and  replaced  for  refueling.  Finally,  potential  
models  should,  if  possible,  be  planned  for  deployment  within  the  next  twenty  years.    
3.10.2  Requirements  Specific  to  Site  Selection    
In  addition  to  the  above  requirements  specific  to  model  selection,  the  following  
must  be  taken  into  account  when  potential  sites  are  being  considered  for  the  
implementation  discussed  in  this  scheme.  Potential  site  selections  should  be  in  areas  
with  the  lowest  possible  seismic  activity,  and  should  possess  high  quality  and  
numerous  roads  between  the  planned  reactor  site  and  nearby  major  highways  to  
promote  more  efficient  and  safe  evacuation.    
4.  Criticism  and  Challenges    
Assuming  the  requirements  summarized  in  sections  3.10.1  can  be  met  through  
the  selection  of  a  particular  model  that  is  currently  being  developed,  the  feasibility  of  
the  implementation  of  an  SMR  in  the  proposed  urban  setting  seems  quite  favorable.  The  
specific  design  features  of  SMRs  provide  benefits  in  many  areas  (safety,  security,  cost,  
etc.),  as  discussed  above,  resulting  in  the  seemingly  achievable  nature  of  the  general  
requirements  for  model  selection.  However,  despite  the  apparent  feasibility  of  SMR  
implementation  in  the  discussed  urban  setting,  it  is  important  to  note  that  opinions  
regarding  the  advantages  of  SMR  technology  are  not  universal.  While  the  opposition  to  
SMRs  among  critics  often  stems  from  a  pre-­‐‑existing  and  overall  objection  to  nuclear  
energy  as  a  whole,  addressing  arguments  against  SMR  technology  in  general  is  
necessary  to  assessing  the  feasibility  of  implementation  in  an  urban  setting.    
4.1  Economics  
A  complicated  aspect  of  SMR  technology  and  potential  implementation  is  
economics.  While  the  capital  costs  associated  with  these  smaller  reactors  are  
undoubtedly  lower  than  the  capital  costs  of  conventional  large-­‐‑scale  reactors,  SMRs  are  
penalized  by  the  economics  of  scale  of  larger  reactors.  This  results  in  an  anticipated  
higher  cost  per  kWh  of  electricity  produced  by  smaller  reactors  compared  to  large.  This  
economy  of  scale  principle  is  considered  to  be  what  drove  the  previous  nuclear  industry  
to  trend  toward  larger  plants  and  the  subsequent  nuclear  reactor  landscape  present  in  
the  US  today  [20].  Those  in  favor  of  SMRs  argue  that  other  factors  could  reverse  these  
economies  of  scale  and  establish  SMRs  as  even  more  cost  effective  than  large  reactors.  
These  factors  include  potential  cost  benefits  of  assembly-­‐‑line  module  construction  
relative  to  custom-­‐‑built  onsite  construction,  reduction  in  required  control  and  security  
staff,  and  efficiencies  associated  with  economics  of  mass  production  if  SMRs  are  built  
and  sold  in  large  numbers.  There  are  also  less  total  capital  funds  at  risk  during  the  
construction  period  due  to  the  modular  design  [26].  However,  critics  purport  that  the  
cost  saving  effects  of  the  assembly-­‐‑line  module  construction  are  overstated  and  that,  
since  potential  mistakes  on  a  production  line  could  lead  to  defects  that  propagate  
throughout  an  entire  fleet,  control  and  security  staff  cannot  reasonably  be  reduced.  SMR  
opponents  also  suggest  that  the  efficiencies  associated  with  economies  of  mass  
production  are  only  speculative  at  this  point  in  time.  Such  efficiencies  cannot  actually  be  
proven  until  hundreds  of  units  have  been  produced.    
   While  the  nature  of  SMR  economics  is  complex,  it  is  generally  more  relevant  to  
the  discussion  concerning  widespread  implementation  of  SMR  technology  across  the  
US  for  large-­‐‑scale  energy  production.  Since  the  intent  of  this  paper  is  to  determine  the  
feasibility  of  the  implementation  of  SMRs  in  a  very  particular  type  of  setting,  and  not  as  
a  widespread  alternative  to  conventional  energy  production  technologies,  issues  
associated  with  cost  lose  at  least  some  degree  of  severity.  Ultimately,  the  feasibility  of  
implementation  in  the  proposed  setting  does  not  depend  on  economic  challenges  
associated  with  large-­‐‑scale  production  of  SMR  technology.    
4.2  Renewable  Energy  Developments  
Another  popular  argument  among  opponents  of  SMR  technology  is  that,  despite  
any  potential  benefits  of  these  reactors  when  compared  to  large-­‐‑scale  conventional  
reactors,  increased  focus  on  developments  in  nuclear  energy  results  in  reduced  time,  
manpower,  and  funding  that  can  be  focused  on  achieving  developments  in  renewable  
technologies.  Even  if  these  reactors  achieve  every  anticipated  benefit,  resulting  in  a  form  
of  nuclear  energy  technology  that  reduces  previous  associated  risks  without  
introducing  any  new  ones,  SMRs  would  still  arguably  contribute  to  environmental  
issues  associated  with  resource  depletion  and  waste  production  in  ways  that  renewable  
technologies  do  not.  As  more  funding  and  focus  are  poured  into  improving  upon  
nuclear  technology,  SMR  opponents  argue  that  more  promising  and  environmentally  
sound  forms  of  energy  technology  are  being  neglected  [20].  
While  there  is  perhaps  some  stock  to  this  argument,  some  degree  of  time  and  
funding  has  already  been  put  into  the  development  of  SMR  technology.  Therefore,  the  
discussion  concerning  the  feasibility  of  implementing  an  SMR  in  the  proposed  setting  
does  not  necessarily  contribute  to  detracted  focus  from  renewable  energy  technology  
developments.  This  argument  may  propose  problems  for  arguments  concerning  
government  funding  for  SMR  research  and  development,  but  it  does  not  serve  as  a  
barrier  to  the  feasibility  of  developing  an  SMR  in  an  urban  setting  as  discussed  in  this  
conceptual  analysis.  Additionally,  reactor  technology  is  being  pursued  that  would  
minimize  the  amount  of  processed  uranium  required  for  energy  production.  The  
Traveling  Wave  Reactor  (TWR),  being  developed  by  TerraPower,  is  intended  to  utilize  
depleted  uranium  as  its  main  fuel  and  could  theoretically  run,  self-­‐‑sustained,  for  
decades  without  refueling  or  removing  any  spent  fuel  from  the  reactor  [34].  Given  the  
large  amount  of  depleted  uranium  present  in  the  US,  the  utilization  of  such  technology  
would  significantly  reduce  the  required  amount  of  processed  Uranium.  Additionally,  
the  TWR  is  expected  to  produce  a  minimum  of  seven  times  less  waste  than  conventional  
light  water  reactors,  furthering  the  argument  that  enhanced  focus  on  nuclear  
developments  should  not  be  discounted  [34].    
   Other  SMR  opponents  argue  that  the  long  timeline  for  SMR  development  and  
implementation  makes  the  technology  irrelevant  to  the  energy  technology  landscape,  as  
renewable  technologies  are  expected  to  be  both  cheaper  and  more  environmentally  
friendly  by  the  time  that  SMR  technology  can  be  widely  implemented  [22].  Again,  while  
this  argument  may  have  implications  for  future  large  scale  SMR  implementation  and  
use,  it  provides  no  reason  to  avoid  investigating  the  feasibility  of  implementing  a  
particular  SMR  model  in  the  university  setting.    
4.3  Mass  Manufacturing  
One  of  the  key  advantages  of  SMR  technology  put  forth  by  advocates  is  the  fact  
that  the  smaller  nature  of  the  reactor  allows  for  assembly-­‐‑line  module  construction  and  
transport  of  almost  fully  constructed  nuclear  reactors  to  the  intended  location.  This  
limits  the  amount  of  on-­‐‑site  construction  that  must  take  place,  resulting  in  a  safer  and  
more  streamlined  construction  process.  Despite  these  benefits,  SMR  opponents  point  
out  that  mass  manufacturing  is  more  likely  to  lead  to  catastrophic  manufacturing  
errors.  Preventing  such  errors  would  thus  require  much  more  rigorous  oversight  and  
quality  control  checks,  requiring  more  funding  [20].  However,  the  oversight  of  the  
production  process  in  the  nuclear  energy  industry  is  more  rigorous  than  almost  any  
other  industry  in  the  US.  Therefore,  the  same  rigorous  oversight  should  and  would  be  
applied  to  the  manufacturing  and  siting  of  SMRs.  Whether  maintaining  this  level  of  
oversight  would  require  more  funds  is  another  issue,  and  does  not  affect  the  overall  
feasibility  being  discussed  in  this  paper.    
Opponents  also  argue  that  the  assembly-­‐‑line  production  would  pose  severe  
challenges  associated  with  potential  defects  and  subsequent  recalls.  However,  because  
of  rigorous  testing,  any  potential  defects  in  manufacturing  should  be  noted  online,  
allowing  for  correction  before  distribution.  If  a  reactor  has  already  been  distributed  
when  a  defect  is  found,  procedures  for  implementing  corrections  in  response  to  such  an  
unlikely  event  would  take  place.    
4.4  Waste  
Another  issue  that  SMR  challengers  point  out  concerns  the  number  of  reactors  
that  would  ultimately  be  constructed  and  the  associated  complications  with  waste.  They  
argue  that  smaller  reactors  would  result  in  an  increased  number  being  constructed  
compared  to  construction  projections  for  conventional  reactors,  resulting  in  a  waste  
stream  that  is  more  difficult  to  monitor  and  control.  This  waste  problem  ultimately  
results  in  greater  expenses  associated  with  SMRs  and  serves  as  a  further  argument  
against  the  positive  economic  benefits  of  SMR  technology.  Additionally,  opponents  
argue  that  the  underground  set  up  of  most  SMR  models,  a  design  feature  that  promotes  
enhanced  safety  and  security,  would  make  waste  more  difficult  to  deal  with  [28].    
Ideally,  the  reactor  chosen  for  implementation  in  the  proposed  setting  would  
possess  a  very  long  refuel  cycle.  Many  of  the  models  currently  being  developed  are  
designed  such  that  the  core  lifetime  is  greater  than  five  years,  some  as  long  as  thirty  
years.  The  longer  the  refuel  cycle,  the  less  often  spent  fuel  will  have  to  be  removed  from  
the  reactor.  Extremely  long  refuel  cycles  make  up  for  any  added  complications  
associated  with  removing  the  spent  fuel  from  below  ground  and  reduce  the  complexity  
of  waste  monitoring  associated  with  a  potential  greater  number  of  total  reactors.  
Therefore,  as  it  pertains  to  the  scope  of  this  study,  this  waste  argument  serves  as  no  
barrier  to  the  feasibility  of  implementing  an  SMR  in  a  university  setting.    
4.5  Summary  of  Criticisms    
While  some  noteworthy  arguments  against  the  widespread  development  and  
implementation  of  SMR  technology  exist,  most  (assuming  their  validity)  serve  as  
reasons  to  limit  large  scale  implementation  of  such  technology.  They  do  not  serve  as  
effective  reasons  to  avoid  investigating  the  potential  of  implementing  a  single  reactor  in  
the  university  setting  proposed.  If  the  goal  of  this  study  was  to  determine  whether  SMR  
technology  should  be  pursued  as  a  large  scale  nationwide  energy  source,  these  
arguments  would  be  more  relevant.  However,  since  the  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  
determine  the  feasibility  of  implementing  an  SMR  in  an  urban  setting,  none  of  the  
above  arguments  serve  as  particular  limitations.      
5.  Design  Assessment    
Given  the  above  considerations  and  subsequent  design  requirements,  several  
SMR  models  were  selected  for  potential  implementation  in  the  proposed  urban  
environment.  The  considered  models  include  SVBR-­‐‑100,  TWR-­‐‑P,  and  EM2.  These  
models,  having  met  the  above  base  guidelines,  will,  in  the  following  sections,  be  further  
evaluated  to  determine  whether  they  can  feasibly  be  implemented  in  an  urban  setting.  
The  models  will  also  be  compared  and,  if  applicable,  the  most  promising  model  will  
then  be  identified.  
  




SVBR-­‐‑100   TWR-­‐‑P   EM2  










101     500-­‐‑6002   240    
Thermal  Capacity  
(MWth)  
280     1475   500    
Type  of  Coolant   liquid  Lead  
Bismuth      
liquid  Sodium     Helium    
Coolant  
Circulation  
Natural     Forced   Forced    
Fuel  Type     UO2   U-­‐‑235  +  U-­‐‑238  from  
existing  depleted  
Uranium  waste    
Used  PWR  fuel  +  
depleted  Uranium  +  
low  enriched  U-­‐‑235  








Rankine  steam  cycle  
with  super  heat  
Direct  Brayton  cycle  






Operational  by  early  
2020s    
TBA    
Refuel  Cycle    
(Core  Life)  (years)  
7-­‐‑8     60     30    




9.2     13.3     4.7  
  
Vessel  Height  (m)   19.4     17.65     10.6  
  
                                                                                                 
2  The  fact  that  this  output  lies  outside  the  range  of  SMR  typical  outputs  will  be  discussed  in  
following  sections.    
Service  Lifetime  
(years)  
60     60   30    
  
5.1  Potential  Light  Water  Reactors    
While  many  light  water  SMR  designs  are  currently  being  developed,  none  of  the  
more  promising  models  meet  the  basic  guidelines  for  electrical  output  and  refuel  cycle.  
Therefore,  no  light  water  reactors  are  considered  for  potential  implementation  in  the  
university  setting  described  in  this  paper.  While  this  is  unfortunate  given  the  
prominence  of  large-­‐‑scale  LWRs  and  subsequent  experience  gained  from  the  
widespread  operation  of  this  type  of  reactor,  a  long  refuel  cycle  is  of  high  priority  for  
this  scenario.  A  brief  overview  of  what  LWR  designs  were  considered  is  included  in  
section  5.4.        
5.2  Potential  Liquid  Metal  Cooled  (Fast  Breeder)  Reactors    
5.2.1  SVBR-­‐‑100  
5.2.1a  General  Information    
The  SVBR-­‐‑100  model  is  a  type  of  fast  reactor  with  lead-­‐‑bismuth  coolant  that  is  
being  developed  by  AKME  Engineering  of  the  Russian  Federation.  This  lead-­‐‑bismuth  
cooled  (LBC)  reactor  technology  has  a  history  in  the  Russian  Federation,  where  it  has  
been  used  in  eight  different  nuclear  submarines  (alpha  class)  over  the  past  fifty  years  
[33],  [38].      
SVBR-­‐‑100  is  in  the  advanced  stages  of  development.  As  of  September  2012,  siting  
license  works  were  underway  and  work  was  begun  on  pilot  plant  specifications  and  
reactor  core  research  and  development  [32].  This  research  and  development  program  
includes  approximately  20  test  facilities  (existing,  modernized,  and  new)  and  involves  
six  different  Russian  research  institutes  [33].  A  complete  reactor  and  power  plant  design  
was  expected  to  be  completed  in  conjunction  with  a  preliminary  safety  report  by  2013.  
By  this  time,  a  construction  license  was  also  anticipated  to  be  obtained  [32].  According  
to  AKME  Engineering,  this  license  was  issued  by  Federal  Service  for  Ecological,  
Technological  and  Nuclear  Supervision  in  May  2013  [33].  The  trial  unit  is  expected  to  be  
commissioned  by  2017  [32].  The  World  Nuclear  Association  lists  the  SVBR-­‐‑100  model  as  
a  “reactor  for  near  term  deployment”  and  describes  the  deployment  as  “well  advanced”  
[29].    
5.2.1b  Technology  Specifics    
The  electrical  and  thermal  capacity  of  the  SVBR-­‐‑100  are  101  MW(e)  and  280  
MW(th)  respectively.  As  mentioned  previously,  this  model  is  a  type  of  fast  reactor  that  
utilizes  a  chemically  inert  lead-­‐‑bismuth  coolant  and  the  standard  fuel  material,  UO2,  
which  is  enriched  to  less  than  16.4  percent.  The  core  operates  without  any  partial  
refueling  and  is  anticipated  to  require  replacement  every  seven  to  eight  years,  which  
corresponds  to  a  lifetime  duration  of  about  53,000  full  power  hours.  This  is  desirable  for  
the  proposed  setting,  especially  given  the  favorable  deployment  timeline.  Additionally,  
the  plant  is  said  to  achieve  36  percent  efficiency  [33].  
   SVBR-­‐‑100  includes  a  fast  neutron  reactor  core  that  operates  without  any  partial  
refueling  [38],  [32].  When  refueling  is  required,  fresh  fuel  is  loaded  as  a  single  cartridge  
[32].  A  notable  advantage  of  the  SVBR-­‐‑100  core  design  is  its  fuel  universality  [33].  The  
design  of  the  reactor  allows  it  to  operate  using  different  fuel  types  (UO2,  MOX,  etc)  and  
in  different  fuel  cycles  without  changing  the  design  and  deteriorating  safety  
characteristics.  The  lack  of  partial  refueling  makes  it  possible  to  change  the  core  content  
at  each  refueling  by  using  the  type  of  fuel  that  is  most  economically  effective  at  the  
current  stage  of  nuclear  power  development.  The  adaptability  of  the  SVBR-­‐‑100  reactor  
relative  to  fuel  type  results  in  the  possibility  to  realize  a  timely  and  graduate  
changeover  to  the  closed  nuclear  fuel  complex  (NFC)  that  will  be  economically  justified.  
Additionally,  during  the  60-­‐‑year  lifetime  of  SVBR-­‐‑100,  the  consumption  of  natural  
uranium  calculated  for  1  GW(e)  is  forty  percent  less  than  the  consumption  by  reactor  
WWER-­‐‑1000  for  the  same  time  [39].    
   The  enriched  uranium  oxide  is  loaded  into  the  reactor  for  the  first  and  second  
lifetimes.  The  fuel  for  the  third  lifetime  is  formed  from  the  first  lifetime  spent  nuclear  
fuel  (SNF)  during  the  second  lifetime,  after  the  SNF  has  been  cooled  and  reprocessed.  
Some  enriched  uranium  oxide  is  added  to  compensate  for  the  mass  of  heavy  atoms  
required  for  loading.  Therefore,  the  fuel  for  the  third  lifetime  is  a  mixture  of  three  
components:  (1)  extracted  plutonium  along  with  minor  actinides  built  up  during  the  
first  lifetime,  (2)  extracted  uranium  and  enriched  in  U  by  10.8%,  and  (3)  added  enriched  
uranium  oxide.  The  second  component  is  distributed  uniformly  over  the  core.  The  
fourth  lifetime  fuel  is  formed  from  the  second  lifetime  SNF,  the  fifth  lifetime  fuel  from  
the  third  lifetime  SNF,  and  so  on  [39].    
   As  with  most  SMR  designs,  the  entire  primary  equipment  circuit  of  the  SVBR-­‐‑100  
model  is  contained  within  a  robust  single  reactor  vessel  [32].  This  integral  design  is  a  
common  feature  of  SMR  technology  that  enhances  simplicity  by  eliminating  the  
necessity  of  large  external  primary  piping.  This  eradicates  the  risk  of  a  loss  of  coolant  
accident  (LOCA)  caused  by  a  large  break  [25].  The  reactor  monoblock  contains  the  core,  
the  whole  equipment  of  the  primary  circuit  and  the  steam  generator  modules.  The  
basket  containing  the  core  and  Control  and  Protection  System  (CPS)  rods  is  located  in  
the  central  part  of  the  reactor  monoblock.  The  basket  is  then  surrounded  by  in-­‐‑vessel  
radiation  shielding  with  the  steam  generator  and  reactor  coolant  pump  (RCP)  modules  
arranged  within.  A  protective  plug  is  placed  above  the  core  [38].  The  reactor  monoblock  
with  backup  containment  vessel  is  placed  in  the  tank  of  a  passive  heat  removal  system,  
where  the  reactor  monoblock  is  secured.  The  water  filled  tank  also  acts  as  a  neutron  
shield  [38].    
   The  mass  and  overall  dimensions  of  the  monoblock  are  such  that  it  can  be  
manufactured  in  a  factory  setting  and  then  delivered  to  the  plant  site  by  utilizing  many  
possible  modes  of  transportation,  including  sea,  car,  or  rail  [38].  The  monoblock  is  4.5  
meters  in  diameter  and  7.86  meters  in  height.  The  core  itself  is  approximately  1.64  
meters  in  diameter  and  0.9  meters  in  height  [39].    
  
































The  SVBR-­‐‑100  model  utilizes  a  lead  bismuth  coolant,  a  eutectic  alloy  of  lead  and  
bismuth  [38].  The  pipelines  for  this  coolant  are  all  external  [32].  The  reactor  passes  heat  
to  a  two-­‐‑circuit  removal  system  and  steam  generator  with  a  multiple  circulation,  
secondary  coolant  system.  The  natural  circulation  of  the  coolant  in  the  reactor  heat  
removal  circuit  is  sufficient  to  passively  cool  down  the  reactor  and  prevent  hazardous  
superheating  of  the  core  [32].    
5.2.1c  Available  Cost  Information    
As  with  all  SMR  designs,  some  cost  reductions  exist  for  the  SVBR-­‐‑100  design  
(compared  to  large  lead  bismuth  cooled  reactors)  as  a  result  of  the  smaller  size,  integral  
design  and  the  resulting  ability  to  exclude  many  safety  systems  [32].  However,  other  
economic  benefits  exist  that  are  specific  to  the  particular  SVBR-­‐‑100  design.  The  lack  of  
partial  refueling  makes  it  possible  to  change  the  core  content  at  each  refueling  by  using  
the  fuel  type  that  is  most  economical  at  that  point  in  time  [39].    Therefore,  some  savings  
can  be  realized  through  prudent  fuel  selection,  when  applicable.  Additionally,  with  the  
existing  low  costs  associated  with  uranium  and  enrichment  of  uranium,  the  use  of  oxide  
uranium  fuel  with  postponed  reprocessing  and  storage  of  spent  fuel  on  plant  site  is  
economically  justified  for  SVBR-­‐‑100  [39].  However,  the  lead  bismuth  coolant  is  more  
expensive  than  other  liquid  coolants,  which  should  also  be  considered  when  
determining  whether  to  implement  the  SVBR-­‐‑100  model  [38].  
5.2.1d  Safety  Features    
Like  all  SMR  designs,  the  low  power  potential  of  the  SVBR-­‐‑100  design  
contributes  to  its  enhanced  inherent  safety  compared  to  large  conventional  reactors  [38].  
Also  like  all  SMR  designs,  the  SVBR-­‐‑100  employs  an  integral  arrangement  of  primary  
circuit  equipment  within  a  single  vessel  that  operates  at  approximately  atmospheric  
pressure.  This  integral  design  allows  for  the  exclusion  of  many  safety  systems  required  
for  traditional  reactors  and  results  in  a  lack  of  high  pressure  in  the  primary  circuit  [32].  
This  lack  of  high  pressure  means  that,  in  the  event  of  the  failure  of  all  cooling  systems  
and  a  subsequent  blackout,  no  core  melting  occurs  and  the  integrity  of  the  monoblock  is  
provided  passively  as  a  result  of  heat  accumulation  by  the  in-­‐‑vessel  structures  and  
coolant.  Additionally,  the  absence  of  pipelines  and  primary  circuit  valves  outside  the  
reactor  monoblock  results  in  design  simplification,  prevents  accidents  from  a  loss  of  
coolant,  and  prevents  blockage  of  coolant  circulation  through  the  core  [33].    
Passive  safety  is  also  achieved  by  use  of  the  chemically  inert  lead  bismuth  
coolant  (LBC).  In  contrast  to  the  inertness  of  LBC,  sodium  (utilized  in  many  other  
reactors)  is  explosive  in  contact  with  air  and  water  [38].  This,  in  conjunction  with  the  
very  high  boiling  temperatures  of  LBC  (1670  °C),  significantly  reduces,  if  not  eliminates,  
the  risk  of  chemical  explosions  and  internally  caused  fires.  The  high  boiling  point  also  
improves  the  reliability  of  heat  transfer  from  the  core  and  thus  enhances  safety  by  
eliminating  the  potential  for  a  heat  removal  crisis  [38].  Any  radiological  emergency  
possible  for  the  SVBR-­‐‑100  reactor  could  not  lead  to  high-­‐‑pressure  radioactive  emissions  
into  the  atmosphere  [33].  The  risk  of  these  and  other  specific  potential  accidents  is  
prevented  or  eliminated  through  various  design  features,  which  are  summarized  in  
Table  3  [33].    
 
Table  3:  SVBR-­‐‑100  Accident  Prevention  Design  Features  
Accident   Mitigation  Through  Design    
Loss  of  flow   Natural  LBC  circulation  mode  
Loss  of  coolant   Double  vessel  structure    
Transient  over  power   Passive  safety  systems  
Local  blockage   Wrappless  fuel  sub  assemblies    
  
The  reactor  also  includes  an  emergency  shutdown  system,  which  involves  six  
emergency  protection  rods  in  dry  channels  that  are  equipped  with  springs  and  
electromagnetic  locks.  The  rods  are  inserted  into  the  core  in  response  to  signals  arrived  
from  the  control  system  or  in  case  of  loss  of  power,  and  also  during  emergency  
overheating  due  to  gravitation  forces  owing  to  the  fusible  locks.  Additionally,  thirteen  
reactivity  compensating  rods  (RCR)  are  equipped  with  the  springs  and  electromagnet  
locks.  These  rods  are  inserted  into  the  core  by  the  control  system  signals  or  in  case  of  
loss  of  power,  and  are  fitted  with  the  weight  increasing  materials  of  tungsten  or  
uranium  to  prevent  their  lifting  in  LBC.  This  setup  makes  it  possible  to  consider  the  
RCR  system  as  the  second  system  of  emergency  protection  [38].    
   Finally,  the  transportation  of  fuel  in  the  reactor  monoblock  with  solidified  lead  
bismuth  coolant  eliminates  the  risk  of  nuclear  radiation  accidents  during  shipment  [38].  
5.2.1e  Security  Features  
Many  of  the  design  features  of  the  SVBR-­‐‑100  model  result  in  a  very  low  risk  of  
proliferation,  including  those  features  associated  with  SMRs  in  general,  such  as  below  
grade  placement.  Additionally,  Uranium  is  enriched  to  less  than  twenty  percent,  
approximately  16.4  percent,  when  using  uranium  oxide  fuel  initially  [32].  The  design  
also  possesses  an  absence  of  breeding  blankets,  where  weapons  grade  plutonium  can  be  
accumulated  [33].  Additionally,  the  long  lifetime  of  the  core  contributes  to  a  lower  
possibility  of  fuel  access.  While  the  seven  to  eight  yearlong  core  lifetime  does  limit  the  
accessibility  of  fuel,  it  represents  the  shortest  refuel  cycle  of  the  three  reactors  being  
considered.  When  fuel  is  transported,  it  is  done  so  in  the  reactor  monoblock  with  the  
solidified  lead  bismuth  coolant.  This  creates  an  additional  technical  barrier  to  the  theft  
of  fuel  [38].  Finally,  proliferation  risk  is  minimized  during  reprocessing,  as  two  percent  
of  fission  products  and  actinides  accumulated  in  the  spent  fuel  remain  in  the  re-­‐‑
fabricated  fuel.    
5.2.1f  Waste  Disposal  Methods    
As  mentioned  previously,  the  SVBR-­‐‑100  spent  nuclear  fuel  is  unloaded  cassette  
by  cassette  [32].  After  being  extracted  from  the  reactor,  the  spent  fuel  assembly  is  placed  
in  a  container  with  lead  that  is  preheated  in  an  electric  furnace  to  a  temperature  above  
its  melting  point.  The  container  is  then  sealed  and  transported  to  a  dry  storage  site  with  
natural  air  cooling,  as  the  lead  in  the  container  solidifies.  This  system  results  in  four  
barriers  that  prevent  any  radionuclides  from  escaping  into  the  environment:  the  fuel  
matrix,  fuel  element  cladding,  solidified  lead,  container  housing.  Additionally,  the  solid  
lead  in  contact  with  the  steel  cladding  of  the  fuel  element  prevents  corrosion  [38].  
5.2.2  TWR-­‐‑P  
5.2.2a  General  Information    
   The  TWR-­‐‑P,  traveling  wave  reactor  prototype,  model  is  a  type  of  traveling  wave  
reactor  that  employs  a  sodium  cooled  breed-­‐‑and-­‐‑burn  (B&B)  concept  and  is  being  
developed  by  TerraPower.  While  the  concept  of  traveling  wave  technology  is  a  more  
recent  development,  many  other  features  of  the  TWR-­‐‑P  model  are  based  on  
technologies  present  in  current  systems.  For  example,  the  helical  coil  steam  generator  
design  is  based  largely  on  the  design  developed  for  the  Advanced  Liquid  Metal  Reactor  
(ALMR)  program  [13].  Many  of  the  components  of  the  TWR-­‐‑P  safety  systems,  in  
particular,  are  based  on  current  technologies  and  will  be  discussed  in  section  5.2.2d.    
   Traveling  wave  reactors  in  general  are  a  class  of  reactors  that  are  uniquely  
designed  to  operate  indefinitely  after  a  startup  period  using  only  natural  or  depleted  
uranium.  The  waves  that  breed  and  deeply  burn  fissile  nuclides  in-­‐‑situ  travel  relative  to  
the  fuel  and  provide  the  possibility  for  a  very  long  core  life,  which  is  extremely  
favorable  for  the  desired  setting.  Such  a  long  core  life,  in  turn,  allows  for  significantly  
higher  fuel  utilization,  up  to  thirty  times  greater  than  LWRs.  Traveling  wave  reactors  
(TWRs)  also  involve  a  high  breeding  ratio,  meaning  the  core  produces  enough  extra  fuel  
to  start  other  TWRs  without  requiring  any  additional  fuel  enrichment.  As  a  result,  
subsequent  generations  of  TWRs  can  be  started  with  discharged  fuel  from  previous  
generations.  TWRs  require  no  chemical  reprocessing  capabilities  with  element  
separation,  which  eventually  eliminates  the  need  for  enrichment.  Thus,  widespread  use  
of  TWR  technology  would  result  in  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  required  reprocessing  
and  enrichment  plants.  As  a  result,  an  expansion  of  nuclear  energy  can  be  achieved  
without  the  expansion  of  the  fuel  cycle  infrastructure  associated  with  producing  
weapons  materials  [13].    
Predictably,  the  many  significant  benefits  associated  with  TWR  technology  are  
accompanied  by  their  own  set  of  challenges.  These  include  the  Positive  Coolant  
Temperature  Coefficient  (PCTC)  Challenge,  the  High  Peak  Discharge  Burnup  
Challenge,  the  High  Cladding  and  Duct  Fluence  Challenge,  and  the  TWR  Design  
Challenge.  Innovative  features  of  different  TWR  models  are  being  pursued  to  combat  
these  design  challenges  and  the  overall  development  is  seen  as  promising  [13].  
   Despite  the  ability  to  combat  many  of  these  challenges  through  design  
innovations,  the  technical  challenges  associated  with  TWR-­‐‑P  result  in  a  less  favorable  
deployment  schedule.  TWR-­‐‑P  is  currently  not  listed  on  the  World  Nuclear  Association’s  
“Small  Nuclear  Power  Reactors”  website,  which  lists  current  SMR  designs  according  to  
their  current  stage  of  development.  TWR-­‐‑P  is  excluded  even  from  “reactor  designs  at  
earlier  stages,”  implying  that  the  feasible  implementation  of  TWR-­‐‑P  in  a  setting  similar  
to  the  one  proposed  in  this  conceptual  design  is  much  farther  off  [29].  However,  
TerraPower  describes  TWR-­‐‑P  as  “near  term  deployable”  and  argues  that  TWR-­‐‑P  could  
be  deployed  by  the  2020s,  suggesting  more  favorable  expectations  concerning  the  
model’s  deployment  [13].      
5.2.2b  Technology  Specifics  
The  electrical  and  thermal  capacity  of  the  TWR-­‐‑P  model  are  500-­‐‑600  MW(e)  and  
1475  MW(th)  respectively.  As  the  electrical  capacity  of  this  model  lies  beyond  the  range  
established  for  SMRs,  TWR-­‐‑P  cannot  technically  be  classified  as  an  SMR.  It  is  included  
in  this  conceptual  design  because  it,  like  SMRs  in  general,  represents  a  type  of  novel  
nuclear  reactor.  Additionally,  the  ability  to  scale  the  output  down  to  the  required  
demand  of  the  potential  university  that  implements  this  model,  serves  as  further  
justification  for  its  inclusion  in  this  analysis.  Finally,  the  lack  of  potential  for  feasible  
implementation  of  all  prominent  SMR  designs  other  than  SVBR-­‐‑100  and  EM2  in  
addition  to  the  many  potential  benefits  of  TWR-­‐‑P  warrant  the  inclusion  of  an  additional  
possibility,  despite  its  non-­‐‑SMR  classification.    
As  mentioned  previously,  the  model  is  a  type  of  traveling  wave  reactor  that  
utilizes  a  sodium  cooled  breed-­‐‑and-­‐‑burn  concept.  It  utilizes  U-­‐‑235  enriched  to  less  than  
sixteen  percent  and  U-­‐‑238  from  existing  depleted  Uranium  waste.  However,  the  general  
ability  of  TWRs  to  utilize  their  own  used  fuel  as  well  as  used  fuel  from  LWRs  eliminates  
the  need  for  enrichment  in  the  longer  term.  The  core  operates  without  any  partial  
refueling  for  the  entire  design  lifetime  of  60  years.  This  is  the  most  favorable  refuel  cycle  
of  any  of  the  reactors  being  considered.  The  fast  neutron  spectrum  allows  for  up  to  a  
thirty-­‐‑fold  gain  in  fuel  utilization  efficiency  when  compared  to  conventional  LWRs  
utilizing  enriched  fuel.  Additionally,  the  use  of  a  liquid  metal  coolant  allows  for  a  
greater  thermal  efficiency  than  possible  with  other  coolants.  While  TWR-­‐‑P  does  not  
specifically  employ  integral  configuration,  the  core  sits  near  the  bottom  of  the  reactor  
vessel,  which  is  enclosed  within  a  guard  vessel  [13].    
  
















































5.2.2c  Available  Cost  Information  
According  to  TerraPower,  TWRs  represent  “the  lowest  cost  alternative  to  enjoy  
the  energy  security  benefits  of  an  advanced  nuclear  fuel  cycle  without  the  associated  
proliferation  concerns  of  chemical  reprocessing”  when  compared  to  other  fast  reactors  
[13].  Additionally,  TerraPower  claims  that  the  TWR-­‐‑P  is  expected  to  save  approximately  
two  billion  dollars  in  fuel  costs  compared  to  current  LWRs,  over  the  life  of  the  plant  [6].  
Additionally,  similar  to  SVBR-­‐‑100,  a  lack  of  partial  refueling  allows  for  the  most  cost  
effective  fuel  to  be  utilized  when  refueling  take  place. 
5.2.2d  Safety  Features  
As  no  radial  piping  penetrations  exist  through  either  vessel  (reactor  vessel  or  
guard  vessel)  the  risk  of  loss  of  coolant  accidents  is  eliminated.  Additionally,  the  large  
volume  of  sodium  acts  as  a  huge  heat  sink,  meaning  transients  are  much  slower  and  
operators  have  much  more  time  to  respond  to  unexpected  events.  Thus,  the  overall  
safety  of  the  plant  is  significantly  enhanced  when  compared  to  currently  operating  
LWRs  [13].    
   The  TWR-­‐‑P  model  is  also  better  equipped  to  deal  with  risks  associated  with  
potential  earthquakes.  Both  the  primary  control  and  safety  rod  assemblies  contain  19  
sodium-­‐‑bonded  and  vented  B4C  pins  in  an  inner  round  duct.  The  round  shape  of  the  
inner  duct  in  combination  with  rod  pin  array  geometry  provides  faster  scram  time  and  
is  less  susceptible  to  jamming  during  seismic  events.  The  helical  coil  steam  generator  
also  contributes  to  the  safety  of  TWR-­‐‑P  specific  to  earthquake  risk  mitigation.  A  
significant  benefit  of  the  generator  is  that  a  long  tube  length  can  be  accommodated  in  a  
relatively  short  overall  steam  generator  package.  This  short  steam  generator  results  in  a  
reduction  in  the  height  of  the  steam  generator  building,  and  also  leads  to  reduced  loads  
associated  with  seismic  events  [13].  
   The  generator  design  is  also  based  largely  on  the  design  developed  for  the  
Advanced  Liquid  Metal  Reactor  (ALMR)  program,  a  design  that  was  essentially  
completed  and  subjected  to  extensive  sodium  testing.  The  planned  changes  associated  
with  the  implementation  of  TWR-­‐‑P  design  include  appropriate  scaling,  as  the  design  
heat  load  for  the  TWR-­‐‑P  unit  is  slightly  lower  than  for  the  ALMR  units  [13].    
   Despite  the  fact  that  the  design  and  operation  requirements  for  the  steam  
generators  are  quite  stringent,  the  potential  for  a  small  leak  in  a  tube  cannot  be  
eliminated  completely.  If  a  small  leak  is  detected  quickly  so  that  the  appropriate  action  
can  be  taken  to  prevent  failure,  a  small  amount  of  leakage  can  be  tolerated.  To  
maximize  detection  potential,  the  TWR-­‐‑P  design  incorporates  both  hydrogen  detectors  
and  an  acoustic  leak  detection  system.  The  former  has  been  utilized  successfully  in  
many  previous  plants  and  while  the  latter  is  relatively  new,  much  work  has  gone  into  
its  development  and  testing  [13].  
   Also  of  considerable  importance  from  a  safety  perspective  is  the  reactor’s  decay  
heat  removal  system.  The  TWR-­‐‑P  heat  removal  is  achieved  using  the  same  equipment  
used  for  normal  power  operation  -­‐‑  pumped  sodium  flow  in  the  reactor  main  heat  
transport  system  (RMHTS),  steam  generation  in  the  steam  generators,  and  heat  removal  
via  the  steam  condenser  and  its  normal  heat  rejection  system.  A  seven-­‐‑day  supply  of  
deionized  make-­‐‑up,  emergency  feedwater  pumps,  and  power  operated  relief  valves  
that  dump  steam  to  the  atmosphere,  collectively  serve  as  a  back  up  to  this  system.  The  
backup  system  is  highly  reliable,  as  it  includes  redundant  equipment,  is  powered  by  on-­‐‑
site  Diesel  generators,  and  is  seismically  qualified;  however,  it  is  not  designated  as  a  
safety  system.  Safety  grade  heat  removal  is  achieved  through  four  redundant  and  
passive  direct  reactor  auxiliary  cooling  system  (DRACS)  loops,  each  of  which  consists  of  
a  sodium-­‐‑to-­‐‑NaK  heat  exchanger  located  in  the  reactor  vessel,  a  natural  circulation  NaK  
loop,  and  a  natural  convection  NaK-­‐‑to-­‐‑air  heat  exchanger.  Each  DRACS  loop,  
submerged  in  the  sodium  pool  at  a  temperature  of  360  ºC,  is  designed  to  remove  3.1  
MW(t)  of  heat.  With  two  loops  in  operation,  the  reactor  sodium  pool  temperature  is  
expected  to  reach  a  peak  of  540  ºC,  which  is  sufficient  to  prevent  economic  damage  to  
the  plant.  Even  with  only  one  DRACS  loop  in  operation,  the  peak  temperature  is  only  
expected  to  reach  700  ºC,  which  is  still  sufficient  to  assure  public  health  and  safety  [13].  
   Overall,  the  safety  analysis  using  the  SAS4A/SASSYS1  code  showed  that  the  
TWR-­‐‑P  design  has  desirable  safety  characteristics.  This  includes  a  lack  of  sodium  
boiling  in  Anticipated  Transients  Without  Scram  (ATWS)  due  to  the  inherent  reactivity  
feedback.  During  protected  transients,  the  fuel-­‐‑clad  integrity  is  preserved,  as  the  
redundant  reactor  shutdown  systems  ensure  a  safe  shutdown  of  the  reactor  [13].  
5.2.2e  Security  Features  
Though  TWR-­‐‑P  is  not  technically  considered  an  SMR,  it  is  designed  to  be  placed  
below  ground,  meaning  it  benefits  from  the  associated  security  enhancements.  
Additionally,  the  use  of  discharged  fuel  from  previous  generations  or  depleted  uranium  
is  less  favorable  for  nuclear  weapons  materials  than  enriched  uranium.  Additionally,  as  
TWR  technology  does  not  require  any  reprocessing  plants  and  eventually  no  
enrichment  plants,  the  risks  from  the  two  most  proliferation  prone  parts  of  the  fuel  
cycle  can  be  eliminated  through  widespread  use  of  TWRs  [13].  
5.2.2f  Waste  Disposal  Methods    
Another  significant  benefit  associated  with  the  TWR-­‐‑P  model  is  its  contribution  
to  waste  reduction.  The  ability  to  utilize  waste  fuel  from  other  reactors  results  in  an  
overall  reduction  in  nuclear  waste  production,  with  a  minimum  of  seven  times  less  
overall  waste.  Additionally,  less  uranium  ore  needs  to  be  mined  since  depleted  uranium  
can  be  used  directly  as  a  fuel.  TWR-­‐‑P  thus  significantly  reduces  the  overall  societal  
waste  burden  by  utilizing  waste  produced  from  other  reactors  and  producing  less  waste  
itself  by  requiring  less  uranium  ore  and  utilizing  its  own  waste  materials  [13].  
Since  TWR-­‐‑P  operates  with  no  partial  refueling,  the  spent  fuel  will  be  removed  
during  a  single  event,  after  the  60-­‐‑year  core  lifetime.  The  fact  that  waste  disposal  must  
only  take  place  once  over  such  a  long  period  of  time  is  extremely  favorable  for  the  given  
setting.    
5.3  Potential  Gas  Cooled  Reactors    
5.3.1  Energy  Multiplier  Module  (EM2)  
5.3.1a  General  Information    
EM2  is  the  abbreviation  for  the  Energy  Multiplier  Module,  a  design  being  
developed  by  General  Atomics.  It  was  designed  as  a  modification  of  an  earlier,  high-­‐‑
temperature  helium  cooled  reactor  and  represents  an  attempt  to  utilize  used  nuclear  
fuel  without  conventional  reprocessing  [32].  General  Atomics  sees  this  breeding  and  
burning  of  the  reactor’s  own  fuel  as  a  potential  solution  to  the  nuclear  waste  problem,  
which  has  been  enhanced  by  the  Yucca  Mountain  repository  cancellation  [10].  The  core  
is  designed  to  operate  without  reprocessing  for  approximately  30  years  [32].  Despite  the  
attractive  nature  of  the  model’s  ability  to  reduce  spent  fuel  inventories  and  the  long  
core  lifetime,  the  deployment  timeline  for  EM2  is  less  favorable.  The  design  status  of  this  
model  is  listed  as  “conceptual  design,”  indicating  that  no  prediction  has  been  made  
concerning  the  eventual  deployment  of  EM2  [32].  The  World  Nuclear  Association  
describes  EM2  as  a  “reactor  design  in  earlier  stages”  [29].    
Despite  a  more  long-­‐‑term  deployment  timeline,  the  technology  appears  
promising.  The  Generation  IV  International  Forum  explored  and  evaluated  fourth  
generation  reactor  concepts,  including  the  high  temperature  gas  cooled  reactor,  which  
rated  well  and  was  established  as  the  most  developed  candidate.  A  preliminary  design  
was  completed  in  2003  and  component  testing  is  currently  in  progress  in  Russia  [26].  
   The  goals  of  the  EM2  model  are  as  follows:  To  reduce  capital  investment  and  
power  cost  by  thirty  percent  compared  to  advanced  light  water  reactors  (ALWRs),  to  
consume  and  reduce  used  nuclear  fuel  inventory  and  subsequently  minimize  the  need  
for  long  term  repositories,  to  reduce  the  need  for  uranium  enrichment  and  eliminate  
conventional  fuel  reprocessing,  (thus  reducing  proliferation  risks),  and  to  advance  
electrification  through  site  flexibility  and  process  heat  application  [26].  
  
  


































5.3.1b  Technology  Specifics  
Based  on  a  closed  cycle  gas  turbine,  the  EM2  model  is  designed  to  produce  240  
MW(e)  and  500  MW(th)  through  the  utilization  of  used  nuclear  fuel  [32].  The  core  is  
anticipated  to  last  30  years  without  the  need  for  refueling  or  reshuffling,  about  twenty  
times  as  long  as  light-­‐‑water  reactors  [10].  As  a  result,  the  lifetime  of  the  model  is  also  
listed  at  30  years.  This  lengthy  core  lifetime  is  extremely  favorable  for  the  potential  
setting  discussed  in  this  paper.    
The  basic  design  approach  of  EM2  is  to  create  very  good  neutron  economy  in  a  
small  core  size  with  the  objective  being  to  maximize  the  neutrons  going  to  fission  and  
conversion.  EM2  is  an  all-­‐‑ceramic  core  gas  cooled  fast  reactor  with  fast  neutron  
spectrum,  very  low  absorption  structural  materials  (SiC),  very  high  U  loading  (UC  fuel),  
and  very  effective  reflector  (BeO-­‐‑graphite)  [26].  The  result  is  that  97%  of  neutrons  
produce  fission  (conversion  of  U238  →  Pu239)  and  higher  actinides  at  beginning  of  life.  
Energy  is  extracted  from  fuels  with  high  fission  product  content,  including  used  LWR  
fuel  and  recycled  EM2  fuel.  AIROX  is  utilized  to  convert  used  nuclear  fuel  (UNF)  to  EM2  
fuel  feedstock,  with  no  separation  of  heavy  metals  or  solid  fission  products.          
The  reactor  uses  carbide  fuel,  a  composite  of  silicon  carbide  as  cladding  material  
and  beryllium  carbide  and  graphite  as  neutron  reflector  material.  The  core  contains  
SiC–SiC  clad  porous  UC  plates  arranged  in  a  SiC–SiC  assembly  frame  making  a  fuel  
assembly  (FA).  There  are  21  FAs  creating  each  layer  and  17  layers  stacked  on  top  of  
each  other,  surrounded  by  a  BeO  layer,  then  a  graphite  reflector  layer,  and  finally  a  B4C  
layer,  all  sitting  in  the  core  barrel.  The  core  is  made  up  of  starter  fuel  of  uranium  
enriched  to  an  average  of  11.4%  U-­‐‑235  with  axial  blankets  of  depleted  uranium.  In  a  
first  generation  plant,  the  fuel  consists  of  about  22.2  t  of  low  enriched  uranium  (LEU)  
starter  and  about  20.4  t  of  used  nuclear  fuel.  The  used  nuclear  fuel  is  roughly  1%  U-­‐‑235,  
1%  Pu  and  mixed  actinides  (MA),  and  3%  fission  products;  the  rest  is  U-­‐‑238.  The  U-­‐‑235  
of  the  initial  fuel  loading  dominates  the  fission  rate  for  the  first  10  years  of  operation.  
After  about  10  years,  enough  Pu-­‐‑239  has  been  bred  in  the  blanket  for  it  to  start  
dominating  the  fission  rate.  At  the  end  of  core  life  after  about  32  years,  approximately  
23%  of  the  initial  heavy  metal  loading  has  been  consumed  (∼14%  fissioned  and  ∼9%  
converted)  and  the  fuel  is  discharged  and  can  be  used  to  manufacture  starter  fuel  for  
additional  EM2  units.  The  peak  discharge  burnup  of  the  starter  fuel  is  ∼300  MWd/kg.  
While  it  is  not  a  pure  breed  and  burn  (B&B)  system  in  its  once-­‐‑through  version,  the  EM2  
can  be  said  to  utilize  the  B&B  principle.  If  a  subsequent  core  starter  fuel  loading  can  be  
manufactured  without  chemical  reprocessing  directly  from  the  discharged  fuel  of  an  
EM2  module,  the  total  family  of  EM2  reactors  can  be  said  to  be  operating  collectively  in  a  
B&B  mode  [26],  [32].  
General  Atomics  claims  that  there  is  no  need  for  uranium  enrichment  after  the  
first  generation  reactor,  as  the  discharge  from  the  preceding  generation  is  used  for  the  
succeeding  generation.  Out  of  each  discharge,  about  38.5  t  is  used  in  the  succeeding  
generation  while  about  4  t  of  fission  products  are  removed  [32].  
EM2  operates  using  a  closed  cycle  gas  turbine.  The  core  lifetime  is  listed  as  30  years  
without  refueling  or  reprocessing  [32].    
EM2  is  cooled  by  helium  gas  with  a  core  outlet  temperature  of  850°C.  When  
compared  to  other  coolants  such  as  sodium,  the  helium  coolant  is  inert,  single  phase,  
nonradioactive,  and  chemically  stable  against  water,  and  no  intermediate  loop  is  
required  for  thermal-­‐‑to-­‐‑electric  energy  conversion  [5].  The  reactor  unit  is  coupled  to  a  
closed  cycle  helium  turbine,  which  is  claimed  to  achieve  48%  efficiency  [32].  High  
temperature  gas  reactors  in  general  have  the  unique  ability  to  use  the  direct  Brayton  
cycle,  which  is  able  to  achieve  such  efficiency.  Additionally,  a  directly  coupled  Power  
Conversion  Unit  offers  many  advantages,  including  vertical  orientation,  short  
interconnect,  a  single  shaft  with  flexible  coupling,  an  integrated  generator,  
electromagnetic  bearings,  and  a  recuperator  and  intercooler  [26].    
5.3.1c  Available  Cost  Information  
Given  the  long-­‐‑term  nature  of  the  deployment  schedule  for  this  particular  model,  
no  specific  cost  data  is  available  regarding  the  construction  of  the  EM2  model.  The  
utilization  of  analogous  technology  in  large-­‐‑scale  breeder  reactors  has  so  far  proved  
uneconomical.  It  is  the  modularity  of  the  EM2  design  that  makes  it  more  economically  
viable  to  utilize  technology  that  uses  nuclear  fuel  without  conventional  preprocessing  
[10].  However,  for  the  purposes  of  this  scheme,  only  one  module  would  be  
implemented,  perhaps  limiting  the  economic  viability  achieved  through  staggered  
construction  of  multiple  modules.    
However,  early  results  show  EM2  can  achieve  a  cost  advantage.  A  reduced  initial  
capital  investment,  approximately  3  billion,  is  anticipated,  as  opposed  to  about  5  billion  
for  a  1.2  GW(e)  ALWR  [26].  Additionally,  as  with  both  previous  models,  some  minor  
cost  benefits  are  achieved  through  the  fact  that  a  lack  of  partial  refueling  allows  for  the  
most  cost  effective  fuel  to  be  utilized  at  each  refuel  event.        
5.3.1d  Safety  Features  
The  entire  containment  is  designed  to  be  sealed  below  grade  for  the  entire  30-­‐‑year  
core  period,  contributing  to  the  safety  benefits  associated  with  SMRs  in  general  
discussed  previously.  Additionally,  the  graphite  core  provides  high  temperature  
stability.  The  use  of  helium  coolant  also  reduces  risk  as  it  is  an  inert  gas  that  does  not  
react  dangerously  with  water.  The  EM2  design  also  allows  heat  to  be  removed  passively  
during  potential  loss  of  coolant  events,  due  to  a  low  power  density,  low  power  rating,  
and  negative  temperature  coefficient  [26].    
The reactor core includes shutdown systems that are independently and adequately 
activated to rapidly shut down the reactor core under postulated accident conditions. The 
static and dynamic reactivity worth of the shutdown system shall be sufficient to 
terminate the reactivity and power transient following a reactor trip in response to a 
reactivity excursion accident such as a loss of coolant [5]. 
5.3.1e  Security  Features  
   Like  other  SMRs,  the  EM2  model  benefits  from  its  underground  placement.  As  
mentioned  previously,  this  below  grade  location  provides  significantly  enhanced  
proliferation  resistance  when  compared  to  large-­‐‑scale  reactors.  Additionally,  the  long  
refuel  cycle  provides  heightened  security  by  limiting  the  exposure  of  the  core.      
5.3.1f  Waste  Disposal  Methods    
The  EM2  spent  fuel  cladding  is  first  removed  and  the  fuel  pulverized  and  
processed  using  the  AIROX  dry  process  to  remove  fission  products.  The  fuel  burned  in  
the  reactor  is  recycled  upon  discharge  [32].  All  heavy  metal  is  recycled.  Therefore,  the  
waste  stream  contains  only  fission  products  and  that  discharged  heavy  metal  could  be  
utilized  in  new  EM2  reactors,  effectively  closing  the  nuclear  fuel  cycle  [8],  [26].    
5.4  Explanation  of  Exclusion  of  Other  Potential  Models    
While  the  three  designs  described  above  represent  the  SMR  models  most  feasible  
for  implementation  in  the  described  setup,  many  other  models  were  considered.  Table  4  




Table  4:  Excluded  Designs  [32]  
Model   Company   Country   Type   Reason    
Westinghouse  
SMR  
Westinghouse   US   LWR   Short  refuel  cycle  
mPower   Babcock  &  Wilcox   US   LWR   Short  refuel  cycle  
NuScale   NuScale  Power  Inc.   US   LWR   Short  refuel  cycle;  
low  electrical  
capacity  
IRIS     Westinghouse   US   LWR   Short  refuel  cycle  
SMART   KAERI   Republic  of  
Korea  
LWR   Short  refuel  cycle  
UNITHERM   RDIPE   Russian  
Federation  
LWR   Low  electrical  
capacity    
PRISM   GE  Hitachi     US   LMFBR   Short  refuel  cycle  




US   LMFBR   Short  refuel  cycle;  
low  electrical  
capacity    
4S   Toshiba     US   LMFBR   Low  electrical  
capacity    
PBMR     National  Project  
Management  Corp  
US   HTR   Short  refuel  cycle  
GT-­‐‑MHR   General  Atomics   US   HTR   Short  refuel  cycle  
HTR-­‐‑PM   Chinergy     People’s  
Republic  of  
China  





Westinghouse  SMR,  mPower,  NuScale,  IRIS,  SMART,  PRISM,  Gen4,  PBMR,  
GTMHR,  and  HTR-­‐‑PM  represent  potential  models  with  a  refuel  cycle  that  is  too  short  
for  feasible  implementation  in  the  university  setting.  While  many  of  these  models  
possess  other  promising  features,  they  have  refuel  periods  shorter  than  four  years,  
which  is  unreasonable  for  the  setting  described  in  this  conceptual  design.  Other  
potential  models,  UNITHERM  and  Gen4,  possess  an  electrical  capacity  that  is  too  low  
for  the  amount  required  by  the  university  system.  While  the  modular  nature  of  these  
designs  makes  the  implementation  of  multiple  units  possible,  it  is  preferable  to  
implement  one  unit  whose  electrical  capacity  meets  the  demand  of  the  university.    
6.  Discussion      
   Based  on  the  analysis  of  the  considerations  relevant  to  SMR  implementation  in  
an  urban  setting  and  the  analysis  of  each  specific  reactor  model,  it  is  reasonable  to  
conclude  that  the  implementation  of  an  SMR  in  the  described  university  setting  is  
technically  feasible.  Economic  considerations  may  limit  some  universities  from  feasibly  
being  able  to  complete  such  implementation,  but  based  on  all  other  considerations,  
operating  an  SMR  on  a  university  campus  is  realistically  achievable.  The  question  then  
becomes,  out  of  the  three  models  considered  (which  represent  the  most  promising  SMR  
designs  for  the  discussed  setting),  which  model  is  the  most  suitable  for  implementation,  
if  such  a  distinction  can  be  made.    
While  each  model  possesses  different  means  of  achieving  the  determined  
requirements  -­‐‑  level  of  safety  and  security,  output,  refuel  cycle,  etc.  –  all  three  do  in  fact  
meet  those  requirements.  However,  as  each  model  also  possesses  its  own  specific  
benefits  over  the  other  two,  one  could  theoretically  be  isolated  as  the  most  suitable  
design.  While  it  may  not  be  prudent  for  this  analysis  to  distinguish  one  model  as  the  
most  promising  universally,  a  ranking  system  can  be  constructed  such  that  a  university  
could  choose  a  model  based  on  its  own  values  or  specific  site  characteristics.      
This  ranking  system  is  depicted  in  Table  5  and  includes  the  model  features  that  
are  most  quantitatively  comparable  as  well  as  the  rank  of  each  model  for  each  specific  
feature.  A  rank  of  3  represents  the  most  favorable  model  for  that  feature  and  1  
represents  the  least.  Comparable  features  include  those  for  which  some  degree  of  
quantitative  comparison  can  take  place  i.e.  features  that  can  be  fully  represented  as  a  
raw  number  (refuel  cycle)  or  features  that  include  various  aspects  that  are  
quantitatively  represented  (fuel  enrichment).  Preliminary  weights  are  assigned  to  each  
feature  to  distinguish  some  semblance  of  relative  significance.  Any  university  
attempting  to  determine  the  most  suitable  SMR  model  could  then  adjust  these  weights  
based  on  their  personal  university  needs  and  values.  The  most  suitable  model  is  then  
the  one  with  the  highest  overall  score.  
  
  
Table  5:  Model  Scores  for  Relevant  Features      











Refuel  Cycle   2   1   3   2  
Deployment  Schedule     1   3   2   1  
Size   1         2       1   3    
Fuel   1   1   2   3  
Total  Score      8   11   11  
  
6.1  Justification  for  Model  Ranks      
6.1.1  Refuel  Cycle  
     The  refuel  cycle  represents  one  of  the  most  easily  comparable  features,  as  it  is  
directly  quantifiable.  The  model  with  the  longest  refuel  cycle,  TWR-­‐‑P,  is  thus  given  a  3,  
while  EM2  receives  a  2,  and  SVBR-­‐‑100,  with  the  shortest  refuel  cycle,  receives  the  1.    
6.1.2  Deployment  Schedule  
   Deployment  schedule  is  another  fairly  easily  quantifiable  feature.  Deployment  
schedules  for  SVBR-­‐‑100  and  TWR-­‐‑P  are  fairly  comparable  (both  claimed  to  be  deployed  
by  early  2020s).  However,  the  World  Nuclear  Association  lists  SVBR-­‐‑100  deployment  
expectations  for  2012  specifically,  without  addressing  expectations  for  TWR-­‐‑P.  
TerraPower  describes  the  associated  expected  deployment  timeline  as  the  “early  2020s.”    
EM2  has  a  much  less  definitive  deployment  schedule  expectation.  Therefore,  SVBR-­‐‑100  
receives  the  3,  TWR-­‐‑P  the  2,  and  EM2  the  1.  
6.1.3  Size  
   Size  rankings  are  determined  by  overall  vessel  size.  EM2  is  the  smallest,  with  
dimensions  4.7  m  diameter  and  10.6  m  height,  thus  granting  it  the  3.  TWR-­‐‑P  is  the  
largest  with  a  13.3  m  diameter  and  a  17.65  m  height,  resulting  in  a  rank  of  1.  The  SVBR-­‐‑
100  vessel  is  9.2  m  in  diameter  and  19.4  m  in  height,  resulting  in  a  rank  of  2.  
6.1.4  Fuel  
   Comparing  fuel  is  slightly  less  quantitative.  TWR-­‐‑P  and  EM2  are  both  more  
favorable  than  SVBR-­‐‑100  in  terms  of  fuel  utilization  in  that  they  both  utilize  large  
portions  of  spent  fuel  initially.  EM2  is  given  the  3  since  the  LEU  it  does  utilize  is  
enriched  to  a  lower  percentage  (11.4%)  that  the  LEU  utilized  by  TWR-­‐‑P  (15.75%).    
6.2  Justification  for  Initial  Weights    
Refuel  cycle  is  the  feature  possessing  the  highest  preliminary  weight.  As  this  
feature  contributes  the  most  to  risk  minimization  of  the  nuclear  reactor  given  the  
proposed  setting,  it  follows  that  it  should  be  identified  as  the  most  significant  
comparison  feature.  It  is  identified  as  a  2,  suggesting  it  is  twice  as  significant  to  model  
choice  than  other  included  features.  It  is  arguably  reasonable  to  assign  an  even  higher  
weight,  such  as  3,  but  the  more  modest  weight  is  given  for  preliminary  purposes.  All  
other  features  are  given  a  weight  of  1  as  they  are  both  equally  significant  and  less  
crucial  than  refuel  cycle.  A  university  with  severe  space  limitations  could  surely  
increase  the  weight  of  size  to  a  2,  and  thus,  also  increase  the  rank  of  refuel  cycle  to  a  3  to  
maintain  its  position  as  the  most  significant  feature.  Based  on  this  very  basic  
framework,  any  university  considering  the  implementation  an  SMR  could  manipulate  
the  weights  to  determine  which  of  these  three  very  promising  models  is  the  most  
suitable  for  their  particular  setting  and  goals.    
7.  Conclusions    
The  purpose  of  this  conceptual  design  was  to  determine  whether  it  would  be  
feasible  to  implement  an  SMR  in  a  university  environment,  using  the  University  of  
North  Carolina  at  Chapel  Hill  as  a  basic  model,  and  if  so,  to  identify  the  best  model  for  
potential  implementation.  All  relevant  issues  associated  with  such  implementation  
were  considered  and  the  required  features  for  any  potential  models  were  established  
based  on  those  considerations.  Given  these  baseline  requirements,  three  SMR  models  
were  identified  as  potentially  feasible  to  implement  in  the  described  setting:  SVBR-­‐‑100,  
TWR-­‐‑P,  and  EM2.  Each  was  evaluated  more  thoroughly  to  confirm  its  potential  
feasibility,  as  well  as  to  determine  the  most  appropriate  model  given  the  urban  
environment  and  the  associated  considerations.    
Overall,  implementation  according  to  the  described  scenario  should  be  feasible,  
as  all  three  of  the  selected  models  meet  the  baseline  requirements  and  possess  features  
that  improve  their  suitability  beyond  that  basic  level.  Based  on  the  developed  
rudimentary  ranking  system,  TWR-­‐‑P  and  EM2  appear  to  be  the  most  suitable,  as  SVBR-­‐‑
100  suffers  from  a  lack  of  lengthy  refuel  period  relative  to  the  other  two  models.  The  
weights  within  the  ranking  system  can  be  adjusted  slightly  according  to  the  needs  
and/or  values  of  any  university  pursuing  implementation  of  an  SMR.    
The  apparent  feasibility  of  such  implantation  has  promising  implications  for  
nuclear  development  in  general,  as  well  as  for  energy  sustainability  in  the  US  university  
setting.  Implementing  an  SMR  would  provide  an  individual  university  with  the  ability  
to  transition  to  a  more  environmentally  sustainable  fuel  source  that  also  offers  energy  
independence  from  utility  companies.  Additionally,  the  successful  widespread  
utilization  of  this  technology  on  university  campuses  3  could  ultimately  contribute  to  
improved  US  attitudes  toward  nuclear  energy  in  general,  and  thus,  to  a  shift  away  from  


























                                                                                                 
3  Specifically,  universities  that  fit  the  description  of  the  urban  environment  presented  in  this  
analysis.    
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